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Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man;
But will they come when you do call for them?
-William Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part One
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Abstract: This thesis aims to contribute to the filling of a theoretical lacuna by asking:
“what role do ethnic ties play in rebel groups’ efforts to lobby for state support?”
Researchers have examined many facets of state support for armed rebel groups. Most
literature on this topic has been dedicated to decision calculi of states choosing to support
rebel groups. However, comparatively little has been said about the other side of this
relationship: the demand for these goods and services by rebel groups themselves.
Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011) introduce the concept of the “demand side”
into the literature, maintaining that “rebel organizations [must] evaluate the costs and
benefits of accepting external support.” However, despite the fact that the role of ethnic
ties in civil war and its internationalization have been thoroughly examined, no scholars
have sought to explore the role of these ties in the “demand side” of the state-armed
group relationship. I hypothesize thus that rebel groups that share an ethnic tie with the
majority of a state’s ruling coalition and/or population are more likely to lobby them for
support. I also maintain that said lobbying will strategically invoke shared ethnic ties and
historical memories, framing appeals in “ethnic terms”. I find that such ethnic framing is
more salient in lobbying diaspora and refugee populations for support than states. States
were lobbied through other means, including the invocation of ideological frames. This
work’s contribution and aim is to start a broader conversation on the role of the “demand
side” in state support and framing processes in rebel diplomacy
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Chapter One: Introduction and Literature Review
1.1: Introduction
What is the impact of ethnic affinity on rebel groups’ international diplomatic
efforts? Researchers have assessed ascriptive identities’ impact on support for rebel
groups and rebel behavior at the domestic level, but something of a theoretical lacuna
exists at their intersection. In this thesis, I intend to begin the filling of this gap of
knowledge by further expanding scholarly research on the demand side of the state-armed
group relationship. My purpose is to disaggregate other potentially relevant categories
that could impact rebel diplomacy and isolate the effect of ethnicity in rebels’ strategic
use of talk. To accomplish this goal, my procedure is to examine case studies chosen
from the Palestinian National Movement from 1967-1982, seeking to assess whether or
not these rebels were more likely to lobby states with a shared ethnic linkage and use
language that invokes ethnic ties in doing so. Although these case studies yielded mixed
results, I discovered useful insights into the demand-side framing processes at play in the
state-armed group relationship
In the first section, I review the extant literature on ethnic identity and its impact
on conflict at the domestic and international level. After assessing work by Salehyan,
Saideman, Kalyvas, and others, I find that while internationalized ethnic conflict is wellexamined, most works are framed around the supply-side. In the second section, I survey
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the extant literature on rebel diplomacy, as it provides a clear starting point in
assessing rebels’ demand-side behavior. I then develop, what is to the best of my
knowledge, the first theoretical explanation of ethnic ties’ impact on rebel diplomatic
behavior. This theory, which I entitle Strategic Ethnic Affectation (SEA), maintains that
rebel appeals should involve the strategic use and invocation of shared language, cultural
symbols and historical memories in a bargaining context. This follows a rational-choice
model of politics, averring that rebels are utility maximizers who seek to present their
own interests as convergent with those of potential patrons. Following work by Saideman
(2002), it maintains that ethnicity is a credible, ex ante signal of shared preferences. I
likewise maintain that rebels will lobby populations within states as a means of
influencing states as well as directly lobbying their governments. In the third section, I
present my research design and test my hypotheses. I hypothesize that rebel groups that
share an ethnic tie with the majority of a state’s ruling coalition or population are more
likely to lobby that state than others and to do so using SEA. In order to test these
hypotheses, I conduct case studies from the Palestinian national movement in the fourth
section of this paper. Using Kirisci (1986)’s logic of cognitive linkages, I examine the
diplomatic efforts and rhetoric of Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP) between 1967 and 1982 . I find mixed support for my hypotheses.
Ethnic ties were shown to be salient, but other frames, like ideology, were employed
either alongside this frame or in its stead. Likewise, I did not find an abundance of
evidence for indirect lobbying. In the fifth and final section, I outline opportunities for
future research and this work’s contribution to the study of ethnic conflict and rebel
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diplomacy. This thesis succeeds in examining the role of strategic framing processes in
rebel diplomacy and contributing to an ongoing scholarly conversation.

1.2: Ethnic Identity and Ethnic Groups
Ethnicity matters, particularly as an organizing principle in conflict situations. A
large body of literature has analyzed the impact of ascriptive identities on civil war and
its internationalization (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Saideman 2002; Koga 2011,
and others). Other works examine how identity can be a key variable in territorial
disputes, irredentism, and on the recognition of new states (Ayoob 1995; O’Lear , Diehl,
Frazier, and Allee 2005; Coggins 2008). These authors aver that ethnic identity is a
significant factor in conflict. However, it is important to begin this analysis with a
conceptualization of identity itself. Fearon and Laitin (2000) maintain that identities are
social categories that are distinguished by rules of membership and behavior categories.
Yet this conceptualization may not be sufficient for the purposes of this study, as I am
primarily concerned with the substance of ethnicity as it pertains to the outcomes of its
invocation. Enter Hale (2004) and Volkan (1999). Following psychological research by
Mead (1934), these researchers develop the logic of identity as a means of distinguishing
between self and others; a kind of “radar” that aids navigation through the social world
through means of shared symbols and rituals.” .This work will apply this definition to its
conception of ethnic groups and identity. Coser’s (1956) concept of in-group bias ,
defining oneself as a member of an ethnic group is as much a statement of belonging to a
group as it is a statement of not belonging to others (Young 1976). Hale (2004)
corroborates this by stating that, like other identities, ethnicity is a means of
distinguishing oneself from others, albeit by means of categories commonly referred to as
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“ethnic”1. The abundance of scholarship on the origins of ethnicities and their political
salience has influenced scholarship on conflict. Yet some work disputes the labeling of
conflicts as “ethnic” or posit that the term lacks empirical validity (Mueller 2000; Gilley
2004). Indeed, Gilley maintains that “there is a strong case for severely limiting the field
of ethnic conflict studies, if not abandoning it altogether”. However, an abundance of
literature2 finds that ethnic cleavages and the usage of ethnic affinity as an organizing
principle have a significant impact on conflict processes and behavior. Following this, I
maintain that ethnicity is a form of “radar” that individuals use to rally others to support
for a group, cause, or movement. This is apparent in the case of Northern Ireland.
Protestant identity is reinforced through shared rituals, such as the parades of the
“Marching Season”, symbols, such as the Union Jack, and employed as a tool for
mobilization, both violent and nonviolent.

1.3: Ethnicity and Conflict
Conflict is a form of collective action, which means that ethnic conflict is a form
of ethnically-oriented collective action, or “ethnic mobilization”. Olzak (2006) defines
the latter term as “collective action based upon ethnic claims, protest, or intergroup
hostility that makes reference to a group’s demands based upon one or more cultural
markers”. Such processes were visible during the collapse of Yugoslavia. In a 1989
speech commemorating the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo3, Slobodan
1

Hale cites Weber (1978) to identify these categories: “ perceptions of common descent, history, fate,
and culture,
which usually indicates some mix of language, physical appearance, and the
ritual regulation of life, especially religion”
2
Such as Carment and James 1995, 1997, Davis and Moore, 1997, and many others
3
A battle in which Serbs were defeated by the Ottoman Empire, invoked to stir up feelings of resentment
against Muslims in former Yugoslavia
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Milosevic called Kosovo “the heart of Serbia”, invoking nationalist myths and stirring up
anti-Muslim resentment ahead of the Bosnian War (Tromp 2016).
A significant body of scholarship explicates the importance of such affiliations
within intrastate wars albeit through different theoretical frameworks, such as Posen
(1993)’s application of international relations theory and Sambanis (2006)’s discussion of
power relations between groups within an ethnically-biased polity These conflicts are
theorized by some as being difficult to resolve due to the “stickiness” of ethnic identities
and their tendency to be reified by warring parties (Kaufmann 1996a, 1996b; Horowitz
1985). Others still reject this reasoning about the role of ethnicity and take a
constructivist approach that emphasizes the potential for identity change and ethnic
defection to occur within conflicts (Kalyvas, 2008). This position, which Kalyvas,
Chandra, and others maintain can indeed offer insights into the dynamics of conflict
behavior. This work, while acknowledging that ethnic identities are fluid and that ethnic
defection occurs, notes that certain actors-such as rebel diplomats and elites-have
incentives to frame their identities in primordialist terms, strategically reifying them to
aid mobilization. As Jones (cited in Walter and Snyder 1999) notes, the case of Rwanda
illustrative of this phenomenon. Indeed, the manipulation of the different social
categories that constituted the labels “Huti” and “Tutsi” at the hands of elites within the
ruling Rwandan akazu4 was a major contributing factor to the 1994 genocide. Oberschall
(2000) develops another explanation of this phenomenon by examining the usage of
strategic framing: individual the in former Yugoslavia did not perceive their neighbors of
different ethnicities as threats until a “crisis frame” was promoted and activated. It is thus
“Little house” in Kinyarwarda: the clan-centric oligarchs that surrounded Rwandan president Juvenal
Habyarimana
4
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apparent that ethnicity can be manipulated by “ethnic entrepreneurs” and made into a
salient organizing principle for violent actors, even in the absence of obvious racial and
linguistic differences.
An abundance of literature theorizes the ways in which ethnicity influences
intrastate conflict dynamics, but what of the salience of ethnicity within international
contexts? Davis and Moore (1997), following work by Zinnes (1980) and Carment and
James (1995, 1997) maintain ethnicity is an attribute that can make certain dyads more
conflict prone. These works find that the odds of a conflict are increased when one
“advantaged” ethnic group receives political or economic benefits that others lack. The
transnational dispersion of minority groups also has a significant effect on conflict
dynamics and behavior. Piazza and Arva (2015) find that the transnational dispersion of
minority groups increases terrorism, playing a “pivotal role in the funding and
functioning” of ethnic terrorist organizations. Likewise, Forsberg (2014) explores the
transnational “contagion” of ethnic conflict and finds that transnational kin ties can result
in ethnic warfare spilling across borders. Though these studies identify the salience of
ethnicity as an explanatory variable, they do not entirely address the specific processes
and mechanisms through which it becomes actionable.
It follows that many civil wars become internationalized. Indeed, according to the
Uppsala Conflict Data Program, this is one of the most common forms of war in the
world today, with 13 internationalized intrastate conflicts occurring in 2014. One form of
this phenomenon is state support or intervention on behalf of an ethnic group in conflict.
Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau, and Brannan (2001) note that between the end of the
Cold War and the publishing of their article, 44 of 74 insurgencies received state support.
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They maintain that states will support insurgent groups for a variety of reasons, including
a desire for regional influence, to destabilize neighboring states, spark regime change,
further irredentist aims, and to support members of the same ethnic and religious groups.
Such support can take a variety of form: the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)’s
External Support Dataset codes seven different types. These include troops as secondary
warring party, access to territory, access to military or intelligence infrastructure,
weapons, materiel/logistics, training/expertise, funding/economic support and
intelligence material (Högbladh et. al 2011).
Saideman (1997, 2002, 2012) and Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011)
provide an excellent starting point for examining the salience of ethnicity in determining
whether or not states give support to rebel groups. Saideman (2002, 2012), following
scholarship by Mayhew (1974), examines the state-level role of ethnic politics in states in
determining their foreign policy behavior. He argues that states will give support to rebel
groups outside their borders because of the ethnic affiliations of “politically relevant
individuals”, i.e. the winning coalition5, and maintains that leaders will suffer audience
costs if they do not credibly back up their paeans toward threatened kin abroad. Koga
(2011) follows this logic and identifies three assumptions of the ethnic tie hypothesis:
that “ethnic identities influence the preferences of individuals… that politicians care
primarily about gaining or retaining office…that politicians need the support of others to
maintain political office”.. Likewise, politicians will oppose groups with whom they
share a history of ethnic enmity due to pressure from their constituents. Saideman’s
(2002, 2012) quantitative tests find a statistically significant relationship between ethnic

5

See Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2002)
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ties and states’ support for external groups. His results were insignificant when he
disaggregated ethnicity into different (racial, religious) categories, but he found that the
existence of a state near the conflict area dominated by an ethnic group’s kin significantly
influenced the level of support an embattled group received. This suggests that more
powerful kin will give support to nearby co-ethnics. Byman et. al (2001) suggest as
Saideman has that domestic politics are salient in determining state support for ethnic
rebels, but also maintain that support for members of a state’s dominant ethnic group
abroad can be a convenient guise for expansionist actions, as in the case of Russia’s
support for Russian-speaking insurgents in Moldova and Tajikistan6. The previously
substantiated logic, though aimed at explaining the behavior of states, presents the idea of
ethnicity as a proxy for shared preferences and demonstrates its significance in
international contexts. This thesis proposes that such decision calculi are also employed
by rebel leaders as well.

1.4 Ethnicity and Principal-Agent Theory
Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham (2011) take a different approach to the
question of state support for insurgent groups7. Instead of examining the role of domestic
politics in this phenomenon, they posit that ethnicity can act as a “screening device” in a
principal-agent relationship. Salehyan et. al explicitly acknowledge that this relationship
has both as supply side (states and other patrons) and a demand side (armed groups
seeking support).
6

The role of such realpolitik aims are a distinct confounding factor this work’s theory, and will be
discussed later
7
To conceptually define what an “insurgent group” is, we follow Staniland (2014)’s definition: “a group of
individuals claiming to be a collective organization that uses a name to designate itself, is made up of
formal structures of command and control, and intends to seize political power using violence”.
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Mainstream economics has long explored the dynamics of principal-agent
relationships and problems in the scope of behavior within firms and markets (See Smith,
1776; Akerlof, 1970; Laffont and Matimort, 2001; many others), but efforts to apply this
theory within political science are comparatively limited (See Miller 2005; Raucchaus
2009; some others). Following Raucchaus (2009)’s work on humanitarian intervention8,
this work will apply principal-agent theory to internationalized civil conflict.
In such a relationship, states (principals) will contract rebel groups (agents) to
fight for them. In a principal-agent relationship, principals will, to the greatest extent
possible, seek to avoid the costs imposed by delegating responsibility to other groups.
Raucchaus (2009) details the types of costs that principals can face through delegation,
i.e. moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral hazard occurs when insured or supported
groups behave irresponsibly because they are guaranteed support by a third party. These
actions occur in the absence of information after support has been assured (the
contracting period). The other risk that principals face from delegating responsibility to
agents is the risk of adverse selection. This occurs due to an absence of information in the
pre-contracting phase about agents’ preferences. As Salehyan et al. (2011) note, this is
where ethnicity is salient. States examine ethnic ties ex ante to determine preference
similarity between themselves and potential agents, thus reducing the probability of
adverse selection. This logic is highly important to my theory: it gives me a theoretical
toolkit with which to analyze the state-rebel relationship from a rebel-centric perspective
rather than a state-centric perspective9. The trend of analyzing this phenomenon from the

8

Raucchaus details how supported groups who are adversely selected can engage in atrocities
Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011) provide another intellectual starting point for this in
framing the state-rebel relationship as one of supply and demand
9
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perspective of states is ubiquitous in the literature. As previously noted, Saideman, Koga,
and others frame their studies around how ethnicity influences the domestic politics of
states and how leaders choose which groups to support based on its influence. Though
undoubtedly important, there is fertile intellectual ground to be broken through studying
the other side of the coin: how ethnic ties are salient to rebel groups’ efforts to gain state
support.
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Chapter Two: Rebel Diplomacy: An Ethnic Dimension?
2.1: What is Rebel Diplomacy?
Sir Earnest Satow defined diplomacy as “the application of intelligence and tact to
the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states” (Satow
1917). Historically, scholarship on diplomacy focused exclusively on the usage of talk
between states. Indeed, as Coggins (2015) notes, it has been defined as the exclusive
province of states, and that the term “rebel diplomacy” may at first appear to be a
contradiction in terms. However, rebel groups and other non-state actors can and do
engage in diplomatic activity. Such activity mimics state diplomacy, as rebels seek to
apply the norms of legitimacy afforded to state actors in the international system to
themselves (McConnell, Moreau, and Dittmer 2012). Non-state diplomacy in general is
theorized to be ““more functionally specific and targeted” as well as “more opportunistic
and experimental” (Keating 1999, cited in McConnell et. al 2012).. Rebel groups’
diplomacy often takes the form of efforts to lobby for support from external patrons: a
means of engagement that is targeted, opportunistic, and likely experimental (Coggins,
2015; Bob 2005; Jones and Mattiacci, 2015; Huang 2015: Asal, Conrad, and White
2014).Coggins (2015) introduces the term “rebel diplomacy” to describe this tactic and
other forms of external engagement by rebel groups. When engaged in civil conflict,
rebel groups will often engage diplomatically with external actors to gain support and
legitimacy for their cause. This strategic use of talk abroad is employed in addition to
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violent tactics domestically as a tactic in civil wars. The literature on this topic is still
nascent, but several clear assumptions can be drawn from the extant material.
First, rebel groups dedicate time and effort to non-violent international
engagement with state and non-state actors. Bob (2005) maintains that since external
support is of critical importance to many groups, competition in the global marketplace
for the material and normative goods that support provides is frequent and fierce. Rebels
have employed a variety of different diplomatic strategies, including “Creating political
parties, relief funds and pseudo embassies abroad”, “using media outlets and personal
contacts to spread the insurgents’ ideology, propagandize, and inform [to] win the favor
or neutrality of key constituencies”, and “diplomatic envoys and lobbyists [to] influence
third party states' policies” (Coggins 2014). Likewise, rebel groups have been prodigious
in establishing front groups to serve as lobbyists, as Huang (Forthcoming) avers.
Movements will both contact potential patrons directly and engage in “rebel
public diplomacy” over social media sites like Twitter (Bob 2005; Jones and Mattiacci
2015). Indeed, such non-violent engagement over social media was key in Libyan rebels’
efforts to gain international support during the 2011 effort to overthrow the Qaddafi
regime as it gave rebels a quick and effective means of presenting their narrative,
clarifying their aims, and framing it to appeal to an international audience (Jones and
Mattiacci 2015)10.
Next, such engagements are strategic and targeted at achieving specific outcomes.
These outcomes may be normative-seeking the same privileges and legitimacy under
10

Jones and Mattiacci note: “Public diplomacy allows rebels to shape foreign perceptions
of the potential benefits of intervention by framing their own beliefs and preferences
as commensurate with those of foreign audiences”
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international law usually accorded to recognized states-or material, i.e. arms, training,
and financial resources. These objectives are broadly conceived of by the CIA as efforts
to “reduce or neutralize the government’s coercive power while strengthening the
capabilities of the insurgency” (Central Intelligence Agency, 2009).Coggins notes that “if
the rebels convince outside states of their cause, they may provide the rebels with
resources, training, or other wartimes support” or engage in mutually beneficial trade,
alliance formation, or other symbiotic behavior. As Bull (1977) posits, the international
state system is a high-status social group with strong barriers to entry. As rebel groups
seek, through secession or the overthrow of their host state’s government, to become part
of this group, rebel diplomatic efforts are as much attempts to gain international political
capital and legitimacy as they are attempts to gain material benefits (Huang,
forthcoming)11. Huang thus maintains that rebel diplomacy is, like statecraft, a form of
“rebelcraft”, and “through it, rebel groups aim to signal to international audiences that
they are serious political contenders for state power, can adopt state-like behavior, are
amenable to peaceful talks, and champion causes that may have wider international
appeal”.
Lastly, rebels will choose communication strategies tailored to their audiences
and frame their cases so as to increase their appeal to potential supporters. Sociological
theory can provide further insights into this phenomenon. Actors within social
movements such as rebel groups, according to Snow and Benford (1988) are “signifying
agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents,
antagonists, and bystanders or observers”. Frames are interpretive modes that allow
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See Fazal (2014) for further insight on rebel behavior
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individuals to ‘locate, perceive, identify, and label" phenomena in the world (Goffman,
1974). The framing employed by rebel groups in their efforts to gain external support is
strategic. Benford and Snow (2000) identifies such strategic framing processes as
“deliberative, utilitarian, and goal directed” in that they are “developed and deployed to
achieve a specific purpose-to recruit new members, to mobilize adherents, to acquire
resources, and so forth”. This work seeks to identify the means by which movements seek
to “link their interests and interpretive frames with those of prospective constituents and
actual or prospective resource providers”. These four strategies, or frame alignment
processes are frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame
transformation (Snow et al 1986; Benford and Snow 2000). Frame bridging occurs when
a group links two congruent but unconnected frames together, as when activists
successfully mobilize support across different issue frames (Gerhards & Rucht 1992)12.
Frame amplification is the “idealization, embellishment, clarification, or invigoration of
existing values or beliefs” (Benford and Snow 2000). Berbier (1998) identifies an
example of this phenomenon in efforts of white supremacist groups; such groups employ
“ethnic affectations” to invigorate their supporters13. Frame extension is when a
movement depicts its interests as extending beyond their primary concerns to issues that
may be of concern to its potential constituents, and, lastly, frame transformation occurs
when a movement “[changes] old understandings of meanings and/or [generates] new
ones” (Benford and Snow 2000).

12

Leftist rebel groups linking their local struggles to broader struggles against colonialism and imperialism
provide an example of this
13
Such affectations are a key variable in this work
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Within the study of rebel diplomacy, Jones and Mattiacci (2015) work to identify
the means by which rebels engage external actors, positing that they will seek to increase
their likelihood of gaining support through such strategic usage of framing. Rebels will
promote specific accounts of events, such that they can show “their side of the story” and
their host government’s purported atrocities against them (“diagnostic framing”) while
promoting themselves as strong and worthy opponents of the regime (“prognostic
framing”), capable of defeating their opponents: if supported (“motivational framing”).
The extant literature on rebel diplomacy provides an excellent starting point for
this project. However, there is substantial room for increasing this body of work’s
theoretical depth. The extant work on this topic details the means through which rebels
pursue diplomatic engagement, the reasons why they engage in such activities, and the
nature of the groups that are diplomatically active. However, theories of rebel behavior14
are common, as are discussions of the role of ethnicity in conflict behavior, such topics
have thus far not been introduced into the scholarly conversation on rebel diplomacy.
This work strives to accomplish both of these aims. I argue that shared ethnic ties are of
deep salience to the efforts of rebels to gain support from external patrons such as states.
This assertion is based on several judgments that will be substantiated in the following
pages.

2.2: A Theory of Ethnically-Based Rebel Diplomacy
My first contention is that ethnic ties will play a significant role in determining to
whom rebel groups address their diplomatic efforts. As previously evinced, rebels’
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diplomatic efforts are undertaken with the purpose of gaining normative and material
goods from patrons. However unlimited rebels’ desires for support may be, the resources
they have at their disposal to establish support-providing relationships and states’
willingness to supply said support are both finite Bob (2005) maintains that the level of
“material resources, technological know-how, preexisting contacts, and organizational
expertise” needed to engage a potential supporter varies greatly across groups, and states
may not be willing to support certain groups at all. As Smith (1776) notes, “the workmen
desire to get as much, the masters to give as little as possible”. To “get as much” rebels
will seek to limit the transaction costs of bargaining with potential sponsors and
maximize the likelihood that they will receive support. This is where ethnic ties become
salient. In and of itself, an ethnic tie implies shared history, cultural memories, and
language15. These different dimensions can make the bargaining environment more
favorable for rebel groups seeking support from states. Shared history and culture can be
credible, ex ante signals of common preferences. To quote de Borda (1781), a principal’s
ideal contracting relationship with a potential agent is a “scheme only intended for honest
men”. To assure potential patrons of their “honesty” (i.e. their credible commitment to
the contracting relationship), rebels that share a common ethnic tie with the government
will engage in a strategy that I will henceforth refer to as “strategic ethnic affectation”
(SEA).
I conceptualize SEA as the strategic use and invocation of shared language,
cultural symbols and historical memories in a bargaining context. Some argue that at the
domestic level, ethnic violence can result in the reification of such ascriptive identities
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See Hale (2004) and Anderson (1983)

17

and that identity change is highly unlikely during periods of conflict due to the impact of
“national memories” (Lake and Rothchild 1996; Van Evera 2001). However, as will I
soon note, this may not actually be true across all cases, ethnic “entrepreneurs” and
activists can enhance the salience of ethnicity as an organizing principle and drive leaders
to take more ethnically-aligned positions (Van Evera 2001; Mueller 2000). This theory
expands their logic, positing that rebel diplomats will seek to influence opinion at the
international rather than domestic level. Likewise, it extends Salehyan et. al (2011)’s
logic of ethnicity as a “screening device”: it follows that rebel groups should target states
whose populations or governments share a common ethnicity with them.
Like other strategies of rebel diplomacy, SEA employs multiple frame alignment
processes. First, it includes the usage of frame amplification through the previously
described strategy of ethnic entrepreneurship. Rebel groups need to present themselves as
capable representatives of the interests of their respective ethnic group to credibly signal
their capabilities to potential patrons, such as when Palestinian armed groups framed
themselves as at the forefront of an “Arab Revolution” (Mishal 1986). Implicit in this is
the assumption that leaders and populations care about the well-being of their co-ethnics.
In addressing this assumption, I must be careful to not reify ethnic categories through
reliance on “ethnic common sense” and “folk sociologies” (Brubaker 2002; Hirschfeld
1996). As Brubaker notes, “Participants16, of course, regularly do represent ethnic, racial
and national conflict in such groupist, even primordialist terms. They often cast ethnic
groups, races or nations as the protagonists—the heroes and martyrs—of such struggles.
But this is no warrant for analysts to do so. I must, of course, take vernacular categories

16

In ethnic conflict
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and participants’ understandings seriously, for they are partly constitutive of our objects
of study. But one should not uncritically adopt categories of ethnopolitical practice as our
categories of social analysis17”.
SEA can also involve frame extension. As previously mentioned, frame
extension is when a group presents its cause “as extending beyond its primary interests to
include issues and concerns that are presumed to be of importance to potential adherents”
(Benford and Snow, 2000). Such framing strategies are common in rebel diplomacy, but
what of their specific relevance to ethnically-based appeals? Individuals have a diverse
range of motivations for participating in war, including personal values, the potential for
financial enrichment, and personal grievances manifested as a desire for revenge. For
some individuals, these motivations may prove to be more salient than ethnic affiliations
and we may witness the phenomenon of ethnic defection. Kalyvas (2008), working from
constructivist theories of ethnicity (such as those presented by Chandra) notes that,
contrary to the assumptions of Van Evera, Kaufmann, and others, individuals can support
actors explicitly opposed to their own ethnic group. This logically follows the assertion
that the framing of conflict is a conflictual process in itself (Brubaker, 2002) Citing the
example of the Mau Mau insurgency, Kalyvas notes that thousands of members of the
Kikuyu ethnic group supported the British colonial government against their kin through
service in the colonial Home Guard. Anderson (2005, quoted in Kalyvas, 2008) notes
that: “these people did not like colonialism .In taking a stand, these so-called loyalists
were in fact motivated by more prosaic and personal concerns: by the interests of their
families; by the need to protect their property; by their sense of social status; and by their

17

Emphasis mine
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own values”. Though this is an extreme example, it makes a point of fact starkly clear:
members of an ethnic group will not always support their kin and may in fact work
against the efforts of rebels within it. This poses a challenge to rebel diplomats engaging
with members of a state’s population. “Prosaic concerns” such as those that Anderson
mentioned may drive them to stay neutral or even oppose the efforts of a rebel group,
even if this rebel group shares a common ethnicity with them. Thus, rebel diplomats will
engage in the “ethnic entrepreneurship” described by Mueller and Van Evera by means of
the strategic usage of frame extension. Rebel groups will seek to make their cause seem
as germane as possible to the ethnic affinities of their potential patrons in an effort to
make this identity frame more salient and actionable. These affinities can be described as
part of a sense of “we-feeling”, rooted in individuals’ senses of ethnocentrism (Sumner
1906). Brubaker (2002)’s conceptualization of “groupness” is a similar concept: an
“event” or process that results from the reification of ethnic categories and can result in
the mobilization of actors around these categories. Following Brubaker’s reasoning that
increasing levels of groupness can result from ethnic entrepreneurship and result in
mobilization along ethnic lines, an increase in such sentiment should thus have a positive
effect on rebels’ efforts to win support. By accepting Kalyvas (2003)’s assertions that the
actions of actors in civil conflict are driven by “local motives and supralocal imperatives”
and that “actions “on the ground” often turn out to be related to local and private conflicts
rather than the war’s driving (or “master”) cleavage”, it logically follows that rebels,
seeking to overcome this difficulty, will work to increase the salience of the “master”
cleavage, exploiting ethnic affiliations to win material rewards. Brubaker and Laitin
(2000) note: “there may be positive incentives to frame such contests in ethnic terms.
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With the increasing significance worldwide of diasporic social formations (Clifford 1994,
Appadurai 1997), for example, both challengers and incumbents may increasingly seek
resources from dispersed trans-border ethnic kin (Tambiah 1986, Anderson 1992)”.
Ethnic categories are easily accessible and actionable especially when placed into
organizational and mobilization-based contexts (Brubaker 2002). When engaging with
potential constituents or supporters, rebels cannot address their prosaic concerns, yet they
can amplify their feelings of ethnocentrism and link workaday issues to this frame.
Kirisci (1986) further elucidates this process in his study of Palestinian rebel
groups. In his study, he draws upon work by Mansbach and Vasquez (1981) and others to
develop a theory of cognitive issue linkages. Kirisci maintains that, in bargaining
contexts, actors will appeal to emotionally or politically charged symbols to raise the
salience of an issue to other actors. Though he does not explicitly reference Benford and
Snow’s theory of frame extension, his logic is almost identical, noting that a cognitive
linkage can occur “when actors come to evaluate a new issue by establishing similarities
between this new issue and an already recognized salient issue” (Kirisci 1986). In
describing the efforts of Palestinian groups to mobilize support, he notes that such
mobilization occurred among Palestinian populations, state governments, and in
intergovernmental forums.
Following this, I note that rebel diplomats may utilize SEA both in dialogue with
leaders and in outreach to states’ populations. Davis and Moore (1997) maintain: “even if
members of an ethnic group are divided by an international border, their ethnic affinity
will serve as a conduit for the exchange of information and as a potential motivation for
action”. Strategic ethnic affectation serves to provide a theoretical explanation for how
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communication through said affinity functions. Following this logic, I assert that if
members of an ethnic group are dispersed across two or more states, they will monitor the
status and behavior of their brethren across the border”. This reflects the assertions of
Anderson (1983), who conceived of ethnic groups as “imagined communities” whose
members feel connected to one another despite geographic distance and, in some cases, a
lack of shared historical experiences. Though many states within the international system
are nation states, the members of many ethnic nations live within more than one discrete
political entity in the international system.
This component of the rebel-state relationship can be explicated by the domestic
politics model presented by Saideman, Mayhew, and Koga. To reiterate their
assumptions, politicians care about maintaining power and need the support of their
constituents. Ethnic lobbies and minority interests are of particular importance to states’
conduct of foreign affairs. Though perhaps a unique case due to the relatively high
responsiveness of its government, within the United States, lobbying by ethnic groups is
common: “Irish Americans lobbied 19th-century presidents to endorse Irish autonomy,
and they joined with German Americans in pressing Woodrow Wilson to keep the United
States out of World War I” and “The Greek lobby had brief success in persuading
Congress to impose an arms embargo on Turkey, and the Armenian lobby has made
Armenia one of the highest per capita recipients of U.S. aid” (Lindsay 2002). Even so, as
Lindsay notes, ethnic lobbying is only employed-and employed effectively-in certain
contexts. One such situation is one of crisis: “Ethnics whose real or symbolic ancestral
homelands are threatened by their neighbors (think Armenia, Greece, or Israel) are also
more likely to lobby than those who come from countries that are secure (think Norway
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or Portugal)” (Lindsay 2002). A situation of civil war would provide just such an impetus
for ethnic lobbying, and rebel diplomatic efforts would doubtlessly amplify this. If, in
such a context, politicians fail to support a group’s their kin abroad, they could suffer a
loss of credibility and subsequent political consequences at home: audience costs (Fearon
1994). Such costs can be severe.: or even fatal Abdullah I of Jordan was assassinated by a
Palestinian activist over his perceived acquiescence to Israel, and his son King Hussein,
nearly suffered the same fate (for very similar reasons) in the 1970s.
If rebel groups directly engage with members of the state’s population and utilize
frame amplification to “radicalize” their opinions towards the conflict they are engaged
in, then the potential costs of not supporting the rebels increases as the state thus risks
inflaming an already incensed segment of the population.
To theorize this critical component of diplomatic interaction between rebels and
populations, a return to the literature on domestic ethnic mobilization-and the behavior of
“ethnic entrepreneurs”-can be highly useful. Olzak (1983) provides us a starting point in
the form of her definition: “the process by which groups organize around some feature of
ethnic identity (for example, skin color, language, customs) in pursuit of collective ends”.
Jones (cited in Walter and Snyder 1999) makes light of this phenomenon by using the
case of the Rwandan genocide. Noting that Rwandan identity was “fluid enough to
manipulate”, the genocidaires and Akazu elite were successfully able to play upon fears
of the encroaching Tutsi RPF, “[raising] the stakes around ethnicity”. These actors
deemed the Tutsis “cockroaches” who would “take revenge on all Hutu, regardless of
clan or religion” making it necessary for Hutu to stand together and take up arms against
them. The tragedy of the Rwandan genocide gives us an example-albeit horrifying-of the
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efficacy of SEA, albeit in an offensive rather than cooperative frame. The literature on
elite manipulation and competition can offer further insights into the nature of this
phenomenon. Gagnon (1995) notes that, when threatened, elites will shift the focus of the
population “by drawing selectively on traditions and mythologies and in effect
constructing particular versions of that interest”. This “ethnification” of politics was
practiced by elites in Rwanda, former Yugoslavia, and elsewhere. De Figueiredo and
Weingast (cited in Walter and Snyder 1999) further explain this phenomenon through the
case of the collapse of Yugoslavia. De Figueiredo and Weingast identify three factors that
produced ethnic violence in this case: “leaders with a tenuous hold on power fear among
the citizenry, and uncertainty about the true intentions of propagators of violence”. They
argue that their second assertion was, in fact, entirely rational: “citizens are willing to
support extreme ends when they fear for their lives, livelihoods, and families”. Frame
extension via SEA provides a mechanism that makes this phenomenon possible.
These domestic nationalist invocations can offer insights into the ethnically-based
lobbying strategies of armed groups. Like Gagnon’s embattled elites, actors will
strategically frame their causes to appeal to the “subjective security demands” of
potential patrons (Jervis 1978). In essence, they must present their struggle and the
threats that they face as ones shared with those whom they are lobbying. By creating and
reinforcing affectations along the easily accessible dimensions of ethnicity, it is logical to
assert that rebels should be able to internationally employ similar strategies to those
employed by leaders at the domestic level of analysis.
Actors, however, can mobilize along different lines and be driven to conflict by
“prosaic concerns” (Kalyvas 2008). Rebels, being rational actors, will seek to maximize
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their utility and the likelihood of their diplomatic efforts’ success. To emphasize the
“master” ethnic cleavage, ethnic entrepreneurs will “selectively [draw] on traditions and
myths to construct suitable and popular versions of their own interests”, “exaggerate
threats” to legitimize political mobilization along ethnic lines by making such ascriptive
categories more salient (DeMaio 2009). Though not explicitly mentioned in DeMaio’s
work, such ethnic entrepreneurship utilizes the framing strategies previously described in
this work. As aforementioned, when Hutu elites in Rwanda fomented hatred of the
country’s Tutsi population, they strategically employed frame bridging and frame
amplification processes, as evidenced through their rhetoric that played upon existing
ethnic insecurities (amplification) and linked Tutsi political and economic empowerment
to Hutus’ political worries (bridging). Identities that are both easily malleable and easily
accessible, like ethnic identities, are thus are the easiest to emphasize. Thus, we may see
variation across cases of strategic ethnic affectation.
There is an implicit assumption in all of the following: that, from the perspective
of the potential patron, the benefits of providing support to an ethnic rebel group must
outweigh the costs. Byman et. al (2001) note, states will support rebels for a number of
reasons, ethnic or ideology affinity is not central to their decision: these “less strategic”
categories have figured in to their decision calculi, but realpolitik aims are more central.
Though Saideman (2002; 2012) disputes this assertion, this point is important to address:
and not irreconcilable with the broader thesis of this analysis. If I assess that states are
predominantly concerned with military performance and strategic goals, I must also
accept that these goals are costly to attain and that rebel groups, especially near the start
of their insurgencies, will lack the manpower and materiel to completely signal their
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resolve. Likewise, it is important to recall that states are concerned with agency costs
(Raucchaus 2009). If I incorporate Brubaker (2002)’s reasoning into this analysis, I can
further assert that ethnic groupness is a variable category that can be increased through
the activities of ethnopolitical entrepreneurs. Taking these factors into account, the
literature indicates the following important points. Rebel groups will seek to signal that
they have similar preferences to state patrons, as, facing a dearth of resources, they will
choose less-costly (or costless) means of signaling their preferences to risk-averse states
Rebels will thusly employ SEA strategies to signal similar preferences to states, with this
strategy taking the form of frame-extending ethnic entrepreneurship. States will thus
assess that their expected agency costs are sufficiently low and that they will be able to
accomplish their strategic aims due to rebels having similar preferences
In international interactions, the actors involved face a lack of information about
the motives of the other involved parties. Uncertainty of motives is a critical component
of much of international relations theory; as Rathbun (2007) notes, “it is arguably the
most important factor in explaining the often unique dynamics of international as
opposed to domestic politics” and figures in different ways to the different theoretical
approaches to the study of international relations. Following this scholarship, I can thus
maintain that uncertainty will be of critical importance to rebel groups seeking
transnational support. Elitzur and Gavious (2003) note that information asymmetry
between two actors is especially important when one party is concerned about the other’s
intentions. Hence, I should expect rational actors to attempt to resolve this asymmetry via
signaling. SEA provides a means of accomplishing this aim. Spence (1973)’s seminal
formulation of signaling theory utilized the labor market as an example: a candidate
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seeking a job will signal their capabilities to an employer through obtaining educational
qualifications. It is possible to continue this metaphor by following Bob (2005)’s concept
of a “marketplace of rebellion”. If rebel groups are in competition for limited resources,
the most (apparently) capable, resolved, or possessed of the most apparently convergent
goals will be the most likely to receive support.
Scholars studying the role of signaling in diplomacy and conflict have maintained
that signals need to have an associated cost in to be credible and thus effective (Fearon
1994; Fearon 1997; Morrow 1999). These “costly signals” signal “clear and direct
positions from an external actor that are costly to establish and maintain”; they are
expected to be effective due to the rational expectations of the signal receiver towards the
sender’s future actions (Thyne 2006). The body of literature that maintains the
effectiveness of costly signals dismisses that cheap talk can be as credible of a means of
signaling. However, another, growing body of literature has countered this assertion and
posited that cheap talk can be an effective means of signaling. Farrell and Rabin (1996)
conceptualize cheap talk as: ““costless, nonbinding, non-verifiable messages that may
affect the listener’s beliefs”. Sartori (2002) posits that cheap talk can be effective if an
agent has a reputation for being honest, i.e. if previous cheap talk directed to the principle
has been true. Thyne (2006) finds that costless signaling by a third party has a significant
effect on civil war onset. Using experimental methods, Tingley and Walter (2011) find
that bluffing-while costless-can still have an impact on actors’ behavior. Given the
aforementioned, I assess that cheap talk can serve as an effective method of signaling.
When written in sequential order, the steps of SEA are:
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1) An ethnic rebel group, i.e. an armed group in conflict with a state government,
decides to lobby for external support
2) This group, seeking to maximize their probability of success and minimize
their costs, chooses to lobby for support from a co-ethnic sponsor
3) In the process of lobbying for support from this sponsor, rebel groups will
frame their situation and their demands using language that invokes common
ethnic ties, historical memories, and other ascriptive links
In summary, the previously outlined theory draws upon and extrapolates
conclusions from several established bodies of literature. First, it draws upon the
literature pertaining to ethnic entrepreneurship. Ethnopolitical entrepreneurs will “raise
the stakes” around ethnic categories, reifying them and turning the “political fiction” of
the group into an actionable category for mobilization (Brubaker 2002; Walter and
Snyder 1999). The causal mechanism for this process is through reifying, invoking, and
evoking ethnically-coded language, events, and memories.
Lastly, it draws upon established sociological research on framing and social
movements. As previously evinced, rebels are “signifying agents actively engaged in the
production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or
observers” (Snow and Benford 1988).
2.3: Factors influencing rebel decision making
Despite the aforementioned, there are conditions under which all components of
this model may not hold. Ethnic rebel groups do not exclusively use SEA18, and even the
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See the example of the PLO soliciting support from The Soviet Union and China
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presence of an ethnically similar diaspora population, state, or other patron is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for ethnically-based appeals to occur. In short, I may see a
degree of variance in the dependent variable. What explains such variation?
First, some rebel groups may simply not seek external support. Salehyan et. al
(2011) state that “rebels that are quite strong relative to the government [that they are
fighting] and can rely on domestic constituencies and local resources have less of a need
for foreign funding and will be unwilling to give up their autonomy”. Likewise, rebels
may fear losing their autonomy: “accepting funding from foreign patrons will often come
with strings attached as the principal assumes some degree of control over the rebel’s
agenda; rebels give up some control over their aims and tactics in exchange for outside
help as sponsors are not likely to offer resources for free” (Salehyan et. al, 2011).
I anticipate that rebel groups will seek external patronage when they require out.
Though this statement may sound tautological, when one considers that rebel groups may
solicit support from local networks or simply not require support due to a surfeit of
materiel and financial resources, its logic becomes more apparent. States can provide
qualitatively different types of support than private individuals or diasporas can: one’s
neighbors usually do not have attack helicopters and tanks parked in their backyards.
Rebel groups are rarely as well-armed as the governments that they oppose and may be
significantly outnumber and outgunned: states are the actors most capable of providing
them with the necessary materiel (Salehyan et. al 2011). Rebel groups often require
training and intelligence support: things that state actors can provide while local networks
and diasporas cannot. Likewise, if a group has separatist aims, recognition by statesespecially great powers-is key to the success of their statebuilding endeavors (Coggins
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2011). Rebel diplomacy could prove to be the start of a relationship that leads to such
recognition.
Among groups that do seek support, SEA may not occur. Such groups may
employ other framing processes and diplomatic methods. One variety of non-ethnic
appeal common among rebel groups are those that appeal to actors whom Asal et. al
(2014) refer to as “conscience constituents” 19and whom Salehyan et. al (2011) refer to as
a “transnational constituency”. Members of this constituency of patrons may not share a
common ethnicity with the group, but will support them out of concern for humanitarian
and other normative concerns. Goulka, Hansell, Wilke, and Larson (2009) note how the
Iranian Mujahidin e-Khalq “has become increasingly adept at crafting and promoting its
image as a democratic organization that seeks to bring down Iranian tyrants, both secular
and religious”. By framing its appeals around the group’s democratic character, it has
gained support from non-Persian actors in the United States and Europe. (Goulka et al
2009). However, the authors of this paper note a pitfall that rebel groups seeking
transnational support may encounter when seeking support: designation as a terrorist
organization. They note: “ despite the MeK’s ongoing attempts to build political support
from the West through a multifaceted public-relations campaign,6 it was not enough to
prevent the group from being designated an FTO20 by the United States as well as by the
United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and the European Union. According to U.S. law,
providing any type of support—political, financial, or otherwise—for an FTO is a federal
crime”. This issue may lead some groups to seek state support or support from groups or
individuals in countries with more lax anti-terrorism laws.
19
20

A term from McCarthy and Zald (1977)
Foreign Terrorist Organization
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Likewise, support-seeking groups may be sought out by patrons at the start rather
than vice versa. Byman et. al (2001) maintain that state support for insurgents can be a
form of “war by other means”; their claims are corroborated by statistical analyses by
Saideman (2002) and Salehyan et. al (2011) that find rivalry between the government that
a rebel group is fighting and the state that they receive support from has a strong,
statistically significant effect on the likelihood of them receiving support21.
Despite the aforementioned, I still anticipate that ethnic rebel groups will still
seek support from co-ethnic state patrons. The literature on rebel diplomacy details the
salience of the demand side of the state rebel group relationship, and ethnic ties have
already been demonstrated to be salient to supply-side processes.
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In Salehyan et. al (2011): regression coefficient of .962, significant at p<.05
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Chapter Three: Hypotheses and Methodology
3.1: Hypotheses
Thus, from the previously outlined theory, I can discern that rebels are utility
maximizing actors who will engage in strategic, ethnically-based framing processes to
increase their likelihood of diplomatic success. As previously evinced, the ethnic balance
of a population may have a significant impact on the bargaining behavior of rebels, as
they might act as transnational ethnic entrepreneurs. From this, I derive these two
hypotheses:
H1: Rebel groups that share an ethnic identity with the largest group in a state's
population are more likely to engage in diplomacy with or in that state than other states
H2: Rebel groups that share an ethnic identity with the largest group in a state's
population are more likely to lobby that state using ethnically-based language than other
states

Alternatively, rebel groups may seek to directly lobby governments for support.
This line of action is more accounted for in the previously described formal model than
rebel groups engaging with the population. Indeed, it may be a more likely way for rebels
to maximize their expected utility. Thus, I hypothesize:
H3: Rebel groups that share an ethnic identity with the majority of the ruling coalition of
a state’s government are more likely to engage in diplomacy with or in that state than
other states
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H4: Rebel groups that share an ethnic identity with the majority of the ruling coalition of
a state’s government are more likely to lobby the state using ethnically-based language
than other states

I will accept and reject these hypotheses on the following bases:
1) The presence of rebel diplomatic efforts
2) The presence of strategic, ethnically-based talk
a. i.e. talk that invokes shared ascriptive ties, identities, and/or memories
b. to achieve specific goals
3) The direction of said efforts
a. Towards ethnically affiliated states
b. Towards ethnically affiliated populations

3.2 Variables

Our independent variables are
A) The closeness in ethnic composition of a state’s ruling coalition to a rebel group
B) The closeness in ethnic composition of a state’s population to a rebel group
Our dependent variables are:
A) The presence of rebel diplomatic efforts
B) The usage of ethnic appeals within said efforts

Huang (Forthcoming)’s operational definition of rebel diplomacy, which defines
its occurrence “as a rebel group’s conduct of foreign affairs during civil war for the
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purpose of advancing its military and political objectives”. To reiterate, she
operationalizes this as when a group:
A) “Opens a political office abroad”
B) “Sends representatives abroad on political missions; or”
C) “Creates a political body devoted to the conduct of foreign affairs (such as a ministry
of
foreign affairs)”

Huang opts for this operational definition as it : “identifies rebel groups that
demonstrate their commitment to, and investment in, conducting foreign affairs; it helps
to distinguish them from groups that may engage in propaganda or strategic talk but
which fall short of these clear indications of intentional diplomatic engagement”. Insofar
as this operationalization pertains to our hypotheses, H1 and H2 can be assessed on the
basis of all of Huang’s categories: i.e. rebel groups will be more likely to create an organ
for foreign affairs and use said body to open political offices and/or send representatives
to states where they share an ethnic identity with either the majority of the government
coalition or the population. H3 and H4 can be assessed on a similar basis.
I conceptually define SEA as the strategic use and invocation of shared language,
cultural symbols and historical memories in a bargaining context. To operationalize this
definition, it is necessary to set ex ante criteria to determine whether or not the rebels’
usage of talk is ethnically-based and strategic.
A) Do rebels use language in their appeals to potential patrons that invokes common
ascriptive ties? (e.g. “Support your Irish/Palestinian/Armenian brothers!”)
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B) Do rebels seek to achieve specific outcomes with said appeals? (e.g. gains in
terms of recognition, material or financial support?)
For example, if a faction of the PLO framed their appeals as being for “the Arab
people” or “the people of Palestine”, this would fulfill category A. Instead of speaking for
“the third world”, Muslims, or another possible category, said group would have invoked
an explicitly ethnic category. In order to fulfill category B, such an appeal would have to
take place within the context of obtaining normative or material benefits. Such benefits
are broadly conceived. Normative benefits include declarations of support, official
recognition, and allowing for the construction of diplomatic offices (as a goal of
furthering international recognition). Material benefits are conceived of as the provision
of direct aid, be it military, financial, etc.
The presence of an ethnically similar state is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition
for SEA’s occurrence. As Kalyvas notes, individuals of the same ethnic group may not
always support their kinsmen’s rebellious aspirations or may be mobilized to action along
other lines. Likewise, some rebel groups may value external engagement more than
others. Groups may prefer to rely on local networks for support rather than open
themselves to the agency and legitimacy costs that could potentially arise from external
patronage (Staniland 2014;Salehyan, et. al 2011).
As averred in the prior chapter, the effect of state interference in rebel groups
could impact said rebels’ diplomatic behavior and rhetoric. If a rebel group is backed by a
strong foreign patron from the outset-or created by one-it will have no need for
diplomatic interaction for purposes of gaining support. The impact of direct involvement
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by Arab governments in the creation and affairs of the PLO and its constituent factions is
an example of this that will be further discussed in the case studies of this paper.
Likewise, states can directly intervene in rebel groups, taking control of factions within
them and playing them against each other as befits their strategic interests. Staniland
(2014) notes how this phenomenon occurred in Kashmir when the Pakistani government
assumed direct control over some factions within the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front
(JKLF) when they did not act according to their policy directives. The cases of Al-Sa’iqa
and the Arab Liberation Front, Iraqi and Syrian proxies, respectively, indicate that said
phenomenon occurred within the PLO.
I thus face a significant methodological issue: support and apparent diplomatic
activity may be supply-side rather than demand-side driven. In some cases, the
phenomena observed in this study will be endogenous. The following case studies will
necessarily assess these potential confounding factors and seek to ensure to the greatest
extent possible that the lobbying efforts I observe are demand-side driven.

3.3 Methodology
To assess the aforementioned hypotheses, I will assess the Palestinian national
movement from 1967-198222 and see if there is evidence that supports the previously
mentioned hypotheses.
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These years were selected as they mark the year that the PLO was founded and the start of the
Lebanese Civil War.
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To conduct a successful analysis I must assess the overall relationship between
our dependent variables (the presence of rebel diplomatic efforts in general and SEA in
particular) and our independent variables (closeness in ethnic composition between a
rebel group and a government/population). A starting point for the development of this
relationship can be extrapolated in the following Pearson correlations23

Correlations
State Support
State Support

Pearson Correlation

Close Kindred
.189**

1

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

N
Close Kindred

Pearson Correlation

837

837

.189**

1

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

N

837

852

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Correlations
GC10
Close Kindred

Pearson Correlation

STAMILSUP
.095**

.184**

.006

.000

852

836

843

.095**

1

.289**

1

Sig. (2-tailed)
N
State Military Support

State Material Support

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

.006

N

836

836

828

.184**

.289**

1

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

.000

N

843

828

Pearson Correlation

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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STAMATSUP

Run by the author in SPSS

.000

843
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These were conducted with data from the Minorities at Risk project (Minorities at
Risk Project 2009). Each test the relationship between nearby ethnic kin and state
support24 for ethnic rebels. The variable for close kindred in this dataset is coded
ordinally, with 0 representing a complete absence of international kin, 1 representing
“close kindred across a border which does not adjoin [a group’s] regional base (including
groups that have transnational kindred but not a regional base)”, 2 representing “close
kindred in a country that adjoins its regional base”, and 3 representing “close kindred in
more than one country which adjoins its regional base” (Minorities at Risk Project 2009).
These levels are conceived of by the MAR project as substantively showing an increased
level of co-ethnic presence. This correlation shows a relationship between close kindred
and state support, conceived of at both aggregated and disaggregated levels. On the
aggregate level, there is a positive25, statistically significant relationship between nearby
kin and any form of state support. When state support is disaggregated into material and
military categories, we see similar effects for both of these variables. Material support,
however, was more strongly correlated with nearby kin than military support. This may
be a result of the MAR project’s wide conception of material support as any form or
amount of financial or development aid (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). Even so, state
material and military support were significantly correlated with nearby kin.
Thus, with nearer and greater numbers of kin members relative to the base of a
group, the greater likelihood that they will receive support from a state’s government as
well as their kin. Though these two phenomena may be endogenous, SEA theory suggests
that they share a common root in rebels’ lobbying efforts among populations.
24
25

Rather than kin support
+.189
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Lastly, inputting the following variables into a regression can allow us to
determine their impact on state support for insurgency:
1) KINSUP (Support from kindred)
2) GC10 (Kindred present nearby)
3) GC11 ( Kindred groups in power)
4) GC2 (Kindred groups present in regional base)

Coefficientsa
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
1

B
(Constant)

Std. Error
.187

.043

.074

.022

Kin Support

.234

Kin in power
Regional kin

Bordering
Kin

Coefficients
Beta

T

Sig.

4.347

.000

.146

3.414

.001

.053

.151

4.453

.000

.018

.018

.038

1.001

.317

.054

.043

.054

1.250

.212

a. Dependent Variable: STASUP

These results indicate a statistically significant relationship between nearby kin
and kin support and state support. Though empowered kin and kin in the region were not
significantly related to state support, kin in neighboring states and existing kin support
proved to be significant determinants of state support. I interpret this relationship as
occurring due to several key reasons. First, rebel groups often face a dearth of resources,
prompting them to seek external support. This lack is both what drives rebel groups to
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seek support in the first place as well as a factor that limits many groups’ abilities to
conduct diplomatic efforts far afield (Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham 2011; Jones
and Mattiacci 2015). Next, kin in countries adjacent to the rebel group’s host state are
likely to share common historical memories and experiences with the members of the
group targeted for lobbying. The case of the Palestinians (which will be explored in the
next chapter) is illustrative, with thousands of Palestinians fleeing or being expelled from
mandate Palestine in 1948 to the adjacent states of Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan (Morris,
2011). Palestinians living inside historic Palestine (i.e. Israel, the West Bank, and the
Gaza Strip) and the Palestinian refugees living in neighboring states share bonds of
religion, family, culture, and the common historical memory of the 1948 Nakba
(“catastrophe”)26. This common historical memory between members of this group lead
to the concept of return to historic Palestine achieving great salience, so much so that
rebel groups founded in neighboring states, such as the Abtal al-Awda (“Heroes of the
Return”), incorporated it into their names and stated goals. These shared historical
memories greatly increase the salience of ethnic linkages; i.e. the actionability of certain
categories. Though certain scholars of ethnic politics, like Chandra, disagree that shared
historical memories fit into the framework of ethnicity, this work takes a broader
perspective, as these memories can shape cultural identity and become effective tools for
grievance-based mobilization.

26

Khalidi and others note the importance of this event as part of the formation of Palestinian national
identity
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3.4: Assessing Relationships of Importance
To assess this relationship, I will begin by assessing the role of the independent
variable, shared ethnic identity, in relevant group-state relationships. How shall I
determine “relevancy”? As previously evinced, my hypotheses will be tested through
case studies of the Palestinian National Movement between 1967 and 1982. I thus need to
develop a criterion of political relevancy for states in this period to be examined across
our cases.
Lemke and Reed (2001) assess the examination of politically relevant dyads-pairs
of states that include at least one major power-in international relations and determine
that the analyses of these pairs does not pose threats to valid inference. For the purposes
of this study I need not ask what states are relevant exclusively to the broader
international system, but relevant as potential patrons of Palestinian rebel
movements.Expanding on the traditional conceptualization of political relevance, I can
create four categories:
1) Major powers
2) Arab states
3) Muslim-majority states (Outside of the Middle East)
4) Communist states (Other than the USSR)
Major powers are deemed to be politically relevant as they are not only the most
important actors in the international system, but are theoretically capable of providing
more and better support than other state actors. Arab states are deemed relevant both
because of their ethnic links to the Palestinian national movement but due to their
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proximity to rebel groups’ areas of operations. The remaining two categories-Muslimmajority states and Communist states-were selected as religious and ideological
identifications could provide additional categories for strategic framing. Palestinian
groups such as Fatah incorporated elements of Marxist and Islamist thought into their
ideologies, making these categories potentially usable in diplomatic framing. As the aim
of this work is to test the salience of ethnicity in diplomatic appeals, we need to examine
the fact that groups may utilize other categories around which to frame their appeals.
The sample27 of major powers consists of the United States, the United Kingdom, the
Soviet Union, France, and China. The sample28 of Arab States is Iraq, Syria, Egypt,
Libya, and Algeria. The sample29 of Muslim-majority states consists of Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, Somalia, Turkey, and Indonesia. Our sample30 of Communist states includes East
Germany, Romania, South Yemen, Yugoslavia, and Poland.
In selecting these states, I assert that ethnicity, ideology, and/or religion are salient to
the weltanschauungen31 of the states that we have selected. Though some studies (see
Freedman 1988) conceptualize of ideology as a “flexible tool” for justifying realpolitik
aims, others take a more holistic view, perceiving it as Hale (2004) does ethnicity: as a
“radar” through which a state’s weltanschauung, and hence its foreign policy, is
developed32. This point is corroborated by Nair (1997), who stipulates that the case of
Palestine has “come to symbolize the significance of a religious identity in contemporary
international relations”.
27

Selected based on permanent UN Security Council membership as a proxy for major power status
Selected based on a simple random sample of Arab states that existed between 1967-1982
29
Selected by a simple random sample of Muslim countries that existed between 1967-1982
30
Selected based on a simple random sample of Communist states that existed between 1967-1982
31
Ways of perceiving one or one’s state’s role in the world in the broadest sense
32
See Dannreuther (1998)
28
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In selecting 20 states, I may be unable to find systemic evidence for each of these
cases. The nature of this selection process raises several possible outcomes. I may be
able to find and confirm cases of rebel diplomacy and attendant SEA processes.
Alternately, I may be able to confirm that no lobbying occurred: or data may simply be
missing, regardless of the historical record.
Historical context is likewise important to acknowledge. Supply side factors of the
era, such as US-Soviet, Sino-Soviet, and other Cold War rivalries have been shown to be
salient in external support for rebel groups in this period, such as the Angolan Civil War.
Likewise, the Socialist, Anti-Imperialist, and Third-Worldist elements of the PLO’s
heterodox ideology cannot be examined outside of the context of this era’s global
communism. These affectations make lobbying efforts directed towards Communist
states far more likely than lobbying directed at the NATO member states listed in our
sample.
In the Arab world in general, and among Palestinians in particular, historical events
that impacted the salience of Pan-Arab identity and Palestinian identity as organizing
principles must be acknowledged. The 1962 dissolution of the United Arab Republic, the
1967 defeat of Arab armies in the Six Day War and the 1970 death of Pan-Arab icon
Gamal Abd El Nasser all stand as important factors.
Having selected this sample of states, I need to determine, the largest ethnic group in
each state’s population, the dominant ethnic group of the state’s ruling coalition, and
whether or not a given Palestinian faction reaches out to them in each given period.
Following the logic of King, Keohane, and Verba (1994), I assess that quantitative and
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qualitative research share the same “logic of inference”. Thus, I will attempt to construct
an unbiased metric of inference, parsing out separate causal factors while assessing my
individual hypotheses.

The spread of the mobilization of PLO support from one conceptual level to another. Source:
Kirişci, K. (1986). The PLO and World Politics: A study of the Mobilization of Support for the
Palestinian Cause. Burns & Oates.

Though Kirisci initially expected the provision of support to progress in a linear
step function, it often occurred between levels, with higher levels (i.e. international
institutions such as the UN and Non-Aligned Movement) causing greater support at lower
levels (Such as from Arab or Islamic States). This behooves me to assess the role of rebel
diplomacy in this process and find cases that show either the presence or absence of
ethnically-based diplomatic appeals within this time period directed either at states or at
populations within them (with the intent of using them to lobby a state’s government).
Potentially confounding factors, such as the impact of ideology, rivalry, and the
Palestinian diaspora will need to be analyzed and accounted for.
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It is difficult, however, to obtain data that are sufficient for this analysis. The
minutes of private meetings between Palestinian rebel leaders and foreign heads of state
are unavailable. However, other methods of analysis can allow one to deduce the
presence and efficacy of targeted, strategic ethnic appeals. This work will utilize such a
method.
First, following Pearlman (2011), this analysis will disaggregate the broader
Palestinian National Movement into constituent groups for the purposes of examining the
diplomatic behavior of these specific actors. The groups that will be assessed are Fatah
and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
These particular cases were selected using the most –similar case method. All of
the cases were selected from the same nationalist movement, though we expect to see a
significant degree of variation in the dependent variable (i.e. in their diplomatic
strategies). This will allow us to control for a number of different outcomes and have a
high degree of internal validity in our results. However, for the sake of intellectual
honesty, it is important to note the flaws of this particular method of case selection.
Though it has relatively high internal validity, its external validity is relatively low:
insights gained from the study of the Palestinian national movement may not be
generalizable to other cases. Likewise, the reasoning inherent in it is deterministic rather
than probabilistic, which may be problematic for analysis. Even so, it is the best possible
tool to utilize to assess our hypotheses.
The 1967-1982 time period will be broken down into three five year periods (’6772, ’72-77, 77-82), allowing me to ascertain what states were lobbied in a given period
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and if the demand-side dynamics of the state-armed group relationships surveyed
changed over time. Next, using academic sources, the states and populations targeted for
lobbying by each group will be identified for each of the three periods. Then, utilizing
available documents released by these groups (Such as those listed in Kadi, 1967, and
available online), the rhetoric of these groups can be analyzed to see if any examples of
targeted appeals exist. The latter step is critical to this analysis, yet it also leaves open the
most possibility for error, particularly causality error. As the first paper on the subject of
strategic ethnic affectation, a certain degree of humility is required: this work does not
pretend to give final answers on this topic, and its analysis will likely be flawed.
However, given the nature of extant literature on this topic and the availability of suitable
data, this method should still be able to provide insights into a topic not previously
explored.

3.5: Sources’ role in the method
. Even if one can assess the expected utility of SEA and note all the reasons that it
should happen, one must still find examples of it occurring. However, this presents a
critical problem: the private transcripts of diplomatic interaction between rebel groups
and states are inaccessible for researchers, if said transcripts even exist at all. It is thus not
possible to directly examine the process of strategic ethnic affectation. However,
examining public pronouncements and documents by rebel groups within the periods of
interest, their examining targets (or rhetorical objects), and then comparing this
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information to the known supporters of these groups within these periods will allow us to
deduce the presence (or absence) of SEA between rebel groups and their patrons.
Fortunately, such accounts were easily located. Works such as Kadi (1967),
Lukacs (1984), and others contain primary sources from the representative time periods.
Such primary sources that are included are:
1) Founding documents of organizations (i.e. the PLO charter)
2) Interviews given by members and leaders of organizations
3) Public pronouncements and documents released by members of
leaders of these organizations (i.e. the PLO bulletin)
There are several issues with this method of deductive analysis that must be
addressed. First, it cannot directly discern the presence of SEA. This is of particular
concern due to the deterministic nature of case studies’ results. Next, public
pronouncements may not be reflective of the material aims and intentions of the group:
their appeals to ethnic affectations may simply be lip service rather than representative of
a deeper salience of such ties. Likewise, as previously noted, a number of exogenous
factors can cause variance in the dependent variable. Proclamations by groups may occur
as a result of state support rather than as a cause of them. As Kirisci (1986) evinces, the
fluid and dynamic processes of mobilizing support for a rebel group can often be
endogenous and difficult to identify individually.
In sum, I can conceptualize this work’s chief research problem as an issue of
separating potentially actionable issue frames from one another, identifying supply-side
and demand-side factors, and determining which of these frames and forces were salient
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in Palestinian groups’ rebel diplomatic efforts. Our identification of different state
categories will allow me to rigorously separate potentially endogenous demand and
supply-side processes and successfully assess my hypotheses.
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Chapter Four: Cases from the Palestinian National Movement
“Palestine is the homeland of the Arab Palestinian people; it is an indivisible part of the
Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are an integral part of the Arab nation.”The Palestinian National Charter: Resolutions of the Palestine National Council July 117, 1968

4.1: Introduction
The Palestinian National Movement is a case that is both like and unlike many
other rebel groups. This movement is rooted in Arab resistance to the British Mandate
and to increasing Jewish immigration to historic Palestine. Indeed, as resistance to these
outside forces continued throughout the first half of the 20th century, a distinct Palestinian
identity developed through and alongside them. Nascent nationalism, often framed in
Islamic terms, could be seen in the rhetoric of leaders such as Izz al-Din al-Qassam and
Haj Amin al-Husseini. However, it was not until the 1960s that a truly cogent Palestinian
resistance began to coalesce, spurred by the creation of the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (Kirisci 1986).
The activities of the PLO and its constituent factions have taken place in a
network of diplomatic interactions between Arab and non-Arab states, where ascriptive
linkages have proven to be salient. The importance of transnational ethnic ties is
elucidated by Fawcett (2014) and Barnett (1998), who notes that the Arab states of the

49

Middle East are “territorial states” rather than nation states, which has resulted in
conflict over norms and identity in the international politics of the region. Indeed, the
dynamics of support for the Palestinian cause are inseparable from regional rivalries and
the domestic politics of Arab states. Indeed, the PLO’s creation resulted from such a
rivalry: Egypt’s Nasser, not wanting to be perceived as weak in the face of an Iraqi
appeal to establish a Palestinian government in the West Bank and Gaza, backed the
creation of an armed organization to reclaim all of historic Palestine. This seemingly
minor diplomatic footnote resulted in the birth of this highly influential guerilla
organization. Though Yasser Arafat maintained that the Palestinian people “had to be
rescued from the stranglehold of Arab tutelage, inter-party discord, and regional Arab
policies” his Fatah faction and others never truly attained autonomy from their Arab
neighbors (Rubin 1994). Miller (1983) corroborates this, noting that the contentious inner
politics of Arab states and their strong influence over Palestinian groups limited the
PLO’s autonomy. He avers: “The PLO’s dilemma is clear. Palestinian power, indeed, the
success and survival of the movement, depends upon Arab support”.
The supply-demand framework that Salehyan et. al (2011) provide us with gives
us a powerful theoretical lens with which to assess this national movement. The
previously described dimensions of state intervention and rivalry fall under the purview
of supply-side influences. However, the constituent factions of the PLO, as other rebel
groups have done, weighed the costs and benefits of diplomatic engagement with actors,
seeking to maximize their utility. Arafat plainly averred this notion in a 1969 interview:
“After all, it is with the Saudi’s money that I buy arms from China” (Mishal 1986). One
cannot wholly separate the influence of the supply side from the PLO’s external
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engagement and diplomatic efforts, but it would be disingenuous to ignore the demand
side of the equation for this reason.
In this historical analysis, I will assess the Palestinian national movement from
1967-1982 and see if there is evidence that supports the previously outlined theory of
strategic ethnic affectation. I need to parse out confounding factors and find cases that
show either the presence or absence of ethnically-based diplomatic appeals.

4.2: Palestinian Ethnic Identity
Ethnic affectation requires an ethnic identity. However, reaching a working
definition of Palestinian ethnicity and its origin is both a necessary and difficult endeavor.
The origin of Palestinian identity in particular has been a topic of lively scholarly debate.
Al-Hout (1984) maintains a primordialist perspective on Palestinian identity, positing that
a cogent Palestinian nationalism has existed since the time of the Canaanites. Muslih
(1988) against this perspective, and argues that Palestinian identity is a product of two
important developments that occurred during the First World War: the fragmentation of
the Ottoman Empire and the fragmentation of Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic ideology.
Muslih’s assessment emphasizes that these factors lead to the development of a local
form of nationalism, known as wataniyya. Khalidi (1992) and Migdal and Kimmerling
furthers this argument, noting that this particular form of nationalism developed due to
the religious and political importance of Jerusalem.
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This study will follow the work of Sayigh (1997) who posits that Palestinian
identity is both deeply related to33-and distinct from34-other Arab identities. This
distinctiveness was emphasized by Palestinian nationalist leaders, corroborating Hale
(2004)’s conceptualization of identity as a form of “social radar”. Outside of providing a
working conceptualization of Palestinian identity, this thesis must accomplish two other
goals. First, it must also acknowledge that Pan-Arab identity and affectations could prove
salient as a means of signaling, because-not in spite of-supply and demand side factors.
With states like Egypt, Syria, and Iraq jockeying for “leadership” of the Arab world 35,
factions PLO often came under the sway of one or more of these polities as a tool for
achieving their broader goals. I will need to assess the level of demand-side salience in
this process.

4.3: Palestinian Rebel Diplomacy
Palestinian rebel groups were active diplomats. Indeed, Mishal (1986) notes that
“the PLO considered engagement in diplomatic activity essential to furthering the goal of
a Palestinian State”. If I am to follow Huang (Forthcoming)’s operationalization,
Palestinian groups engaged in all three forms of rebel diplomatic activity, as they opened
offices abroad, had a department for the conduct of international affairs36 and sent
representatives on political missions. Palestinian armed groups conducted diplomatic
activity with Arab States in the Middle East, non-Arab states outside of the region, and
33

“Palestinians have moreover stressed their commonality, rather than distinctiveness, of culture with
neighboring Arab societies, with which they share language, religion, social custom, and family ties”
(Sayigh, 1997)
34
“Collective memories, perceptions of common injustice, and the sense of belonging to a particular
territory provided a basis for turning a latent collectivity into a community, and set Palestinians apart
from other Arabs, with whom language, religion, and culture were shared” (Sayigh, 1997)
35
See Fawcett, Barnett
36
The Political Department
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other armed groups. However, did these groups engage in diplomatic activity in the ways
and for the reasons hypothesized in this work? To determine this, it is necessary to
engage with the historical and political record of events and the context in which such
diplomatic activities occurred, drawing several key assumptions from the extant
literature.
First, the relationship of the PNM’s constituent factions to Arab states was by
their subordinate status. Rubin (1994) maintains: “the Arab states often saw the PLO as a
useful tool to manipulate but never considered it an equal partner, never consulting it nor
respecting its interests when setting their policy” and that “When not ignoring the PLO,
they interfered with it”. Even so, Palestinian groups were dependent on Arab states for
“bases, supplies, training, money, arms, political backing, and protection against
retaliation” (Rubin 1994). Though Palestinian groups such as Fatah sought to maximize
their autonomy to the greatest extent possible, diplomatic relations with other states still
occurred across a vast power differential. Arab states such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria,
“[controlled] large territories, huge economic resources, well-equipped armies, and
populations far exceeding the total number of Palestinians” (Rubin 1994). This power
differential, and Palestinian group’s inextricable linkages to the inner politics and
rivalries of Arab states “crippled PLO diplomacy” (McLaurin 1989). However, these
linkages ensured the survival the group. Demand-side incentives very likely influenced
the PLO’s continued engagement with Arab states. Despite the severe costs to their
autonomy, Arab governmental support gave Palestinian factions legitimacy on the “Arab
street” and continued material benefits.
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Next, influential individuals-rather than an organized diplomatic corps-were
responsible for much of Palestinian groups’ rebel diplomatic activity. Leaders of groups,
such as the PFLP’s George Habash or Fatah’s Yasser Arafat personally traveled to
different states and lobbied on behalf of their factions: “Arafat traveled in perpetual
motion among Arab capitals, preserving his connections and making deals” (Rubin
1994).
In many ways, the PLO is both like and unlike other rebel groups engaged in
diplomacy. The PLO was active in diplomacy with state governments, but the Palestinian
diaspora played an important role in Palestinian efforts to gain external support. As
Byman et. al (2011) evince:
“..diasporas are largely motivated by ethnic affinity.
Indeed, almost inherent to the idea of a diaspora is the
concept of homeland. Communities abroad often feel a
genuine sympathy for the struggles of their brethren
elsewhere. At times, they may also feel a sense of guilt that
they are safe while those left behind are enmeshed in brutal
and bloody conflict. Insurgent groups actively play on this
sympathy and guilt to secure critical financial and political
support. When such support is not forthcoming, insurgents
sometimes resort to coercion”.
Byman et. al (2011) also note that diasporas have been active in securing political
support for insurgencies. Citing the cases of the Armenian, Kurdish, and Tamil diasporas,
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the authors note that these actors have succeeded in pressuring governments to provide
support to the rebel groups that represent them. Governments may choose not to-or be
unable to-block support for diasporas. In the particular case of the PNM, Arab states
chose to continue the provision of support to Palestinian groups due to the risk of
reprisals from Palestinians angered by a perceived lack of resolve or of acquiescence to
Israel. These risks were born both from dramatic events such as the assassination of
Jordanian King Abdullah I as well as the high population of Palestinian refugees
throughout the Middle East37.
As the role of the PLO in outreach to Palestinian diaspora/refugee populations is
well documented38, the role that this paper needs to play is in establishing the link
between the processes of mobilizing support among Palestinian refugees and ensuring
support from Arab governments. I assess that these processes would take the form of the
ethnic entrepreneurship that Kalyvas, Van Evera, and Mueller describe, using the framing
strategies observed by Benford and Snow.

4.4: Ethnicity and Ideology
Though constituent parts of a national movement, Palestinian armed groups
incorporated non-nationalistic elements into their ideological frames of reference. The
doctrinal and ideological heterodoxy of these armed groups presents us with a research
conundrum: what frames were most actionable and when? As these dimensions of

37
38

3,353,000 in 1977 (Kirisci 1986)
See Kirisci (1986), Sayigh (1997), others
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ideology and identity could have been strategically invoked in negotiations in lieu of
ethnicity, it behooves me to assess their salience relative to that of SEA.
I must first identify frames of relevance. Rubin argues that Fatah’s ideology
evolved throughout the 1960s into an eclectic blend of “Islam [and] Marxism-Leninism
[and also] Third World radical nationalism” (Rubin 1994). Due to this, I selected both
Muslim states and Communist states as well as Arab states into this thesis’ criterion of
political relevancy, allowing me to assess each of these categories’ importance to
Palestinian rebel diplomacy.

4.5: The Role of Arab Nationalism
As Ayoob (1995) notes: “Most regimes in Africa and the Middle East do not meet
the test of political legitimacy by a long measure because they preside over artificial
colonial constructs that are very vulnerable to internal challenges”. The creation of the
PLO-and the relationship between its constituent groups and Arab states-was highly
moderated by the potential agency costs of that relationship, specifically to states’
sovereignty. As previously evinced, Fawcett (2014) posits that Arab states are not
nation-states, but rather “territorial states”39, in which a transnational ethnic group
dominates multiple states and no one state government can legitimately claim to speak
for the “Arabs”. In this vacuum of legitimacy, the cause of Palestine provided an
opportunity for Arab leaders to showcase their ethnic bona fides to their populations and
in normative competition with other states (Barnett, 1998). Palestinian groups employed
39

Alternatively, “national states” (Sayigh, 1997)
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the language of Arabism in their propaganda and in engagements with Arab states, which
played both with and against the interests of Arab leaders.
Due to the factors that Fawcett (2014) outlined, Arabism has taken on a variety of
forms both disparate and unified. No one individual has been able to legitimately speak
for the entire “Arab street”, though some with pretensions to such a position, such as the
leaders of Egypt and Syria, would perceive a vehicle for their ambitions in the factions of
the Palestinian national movement. Indeed, to understand the successes and failures of
these groups’ efforts at lobbying for support, it is necessary to understand the tensions
that existed between the competing forms of Arabism.
Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch (1973), as well as other scholars, (See Baram 1983)
identify the different varieties of Arab nationalism: qawmiyya nationalism and wataniyya
nationalism. The former, derived from the word qawm (nation, people) is a variety of
ethnic nationalism that signifies an affinity to the Arab people conceived as a whole. As
previously evinced, the latter is derived from the word watan (homeland) and representss
a local commitment to one’s own country rather than the whole imagined community of
the Arabs (Muslih 1988; Anderson 1982). The ethnic –based appeals of Palestinian
groups contended with and appealed to different aspects of these nationalisms at different
points. Necesarilly, qawmiyya was utilized when appealing to Pan-Arabist sentiments,
and wataniyya was employed when lobbying Palestinian populations within states.
Wataniyya , as a form of local nationalism ,is inextricably linked to the concerns
over autonomy and sovereignty that Ayoob (1995) identifies. Arab leaders, such as King
Hussein of Jordan, sought to combat “regionalism” (iqlimiyya), i.e. the efforts of hardline
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Palestinian groups to appeal to qawmiyya nationalism and seek the overthrow of
conservative, “reactionary” regimes such as Hussein’s, which were perceived as being
opposed to the liberation of Palestine and servants of Western interests (Sayigh, 1997). I
follow Ayoob (1995)’s logic of third-world vulnerability to build an explanation for this
phenomenon. Although heterodox, it both supports and is supported by my prior
assertions.
To defuse these leaders’ concerns and ensure the ongoing provision of support,
the leadership of Fateh framed its cause as one that sought to create a Palestinian state
rather than a pan-Arab polity. They accomplished this by emphasizing the distinctiveness
of their Palestinian identity and framing their efforts in the language of wataniyya.
However, some Palestinian groups, such as the PFLP, employed the language of
qawmiyya and won the support of revisionist Arab states such as Iraq, Syria, and Libya.
These states were relatively small and dissatisfied with the regional status quo, as shown
by their long-standing unwillingness to make peace with Israel. Heraclides (1990) found
that such states are more likely to intervene on behalf of or support rebel groups for
ideational or ideological reasons. Thus, “regionalist” appeals played into their interests.
However, this interpretation contradicts the scholarly consensus on the matter, which
posits that the PLO’s emphasis on the “specificity” of Palestinian nationalism is rooted in
the failures of Pan-Arabism to provide a solution to the question of Palestine. Even so,
through the case of Palestine, one can see ethnic appeals’ fluid nature.
Mishal (1986) notes: “ a dual Arab-Palestinian identity, a shared commitment to
pan-Arab political unity, and exposure to both symbolic and material influences from
different Arab regimes increased the tendency among the Palestinian organizations to
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endow their Palestinian national aspirations with an all-Arab meaning. No Palestinian
could afford to be accused by fellow Arabs of preferring parochial Palestinian interests
(iqlimiyya) over broad Arab nationalist ones”. Following this logic, he avers that
Palestinian rebel groups “searched for differing formulas to balance the demands of Arab
nationalism and the requirements of Palestinian aspirations”. Such rhetorical shifts are
not surprising: as rebel groups will often alter their behavior to gain or maintain
international recognition and support (Fazal 2013)
The oft-uneasy balance between the aspirations of Palestinian wataniyya and Arab
qawmiyya is most starkly reflected in the language of the 1968 Palestinian National
Covenant. Article 8 of the covenant states that: “The phase in which the people of
Palestine is living is that of national struggle” and utilizes the adjective watani to
stipulate the specific, Palestinian nature of this endeavor. Article 11, however, stipulates:
“The Palestinians will have three mottoes, national unity; national mobilization and
liberation”, describing their unity as part of wataniyya and their mobilization in terms of
qawmiyya. This rhetorical tension is further reflected in Articles 12-15 of the Covenant.
The former article, in its entirety, reads: “The Palestinian Arab people believe in Arab
unity. To fulfill its role in realizing this, it must preserve, in this phase of its national
struggle, its Palestinian personality and the constituents thereof, increase consciousness
of its existence and resist any plan that tends to integrate or weaken it”. The rhetoric of
this part of the Covenant affirms the tension between maintaining a commitment to the
ideals of pan-Arabism while not presenting an overtly maximalist viewpoint that would
alienate the PLO’s state sponsors. This is evident in the usage of the adjective watani40 to

40

“National” as in “wataniyya” nationalism
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describe their struggle rather than qawmi, all while offering rhetorical overtures to Arab
unity. Articles 13 and 14 explicitly frame the issue of Palestine in Pan-Arab terms: “The
destiny of the Arab nation, indeed the very Arab existence, depends upon the destiny of
the Palestine issue”, as does Article 15, which states that Palestine is part of “the great
Arab homeland” and that it is “a national (qawmi) duty to repulse the Zionist, Imperialist
invasion” of it. As well as a means of assuaging the fears of Arab leaders, the PLO’s
rhetorical paeans to wataniyya were a means of addressing the fundamental paradox of
Palestinian nationalism: as Palestinians are Arabs who share a similar culture, language,
religion, and history to other Arabs, they could be denied the right to their own particular
state. Emphasizing the particular, Palestinian elements of their identity and of the
territory they sought to control was a legitimizing strategy that allowed the PLO to
continue to function as a national movement. As will be reflected in the case studies to
come, the balance between these forms of nationalism was not always easily maintained.
Palestinian rebel diplomats likewise faced a unique dynamic vis a vis the
Palestinian refugee population in neighboring Arab states. Palestinian armed groups
depended heavily on the provision of sanctuary and support by local populations.
Particularly in Lebanon, the greatest providers of such support to Palestinian guerillas
were Palestinian refugees living in refugee camps on the outskirts of major cities like
Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon. This assessment of the role of ethnicity in Palestinian rebel
diplomacy needs to take all of these factors into account.
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4.6 The Case of Fatah
Yasser Arafat, a Palestinian activist who would arguably become the most
important figure in the Palestinian history, founded the Palestinian National Liberation
Movement, better known by the reverse acronym Fatah41, in 1959. Though dedicated to
the reconquest of Palestine, Fatah was international from its inception: Arafat widely
traveled, recruiting members and establishing bases abroad in Algeria, Syria, and Jordan
in the years after the group’s founding. Ultimately, Arafat would remain chairman of the
PLO until his death. Under his leadership Fatah became the largest and strongest faction
within the Palestinian national movement: as well as one of the most involved in rebel
diplomacy.
In 1969, Arafat became the Chairman of the PLO. Arafat’s “resistance-oriented”
leadership “enabled the PLO to have a more effective and central role in mobilizing the
Palestinians and in expanding its basis of support both at the local and the international
level” (Kirisci 1986). Fatah would ultimately become-and remain- the largest faction in
the PLO. As will be detailed, this ideologically heterodox organization was
diplomatically active and employed multiple frames a frame alignment processes in its
efforts to gain normative and material goods.
4.6a: Fatah from 1967-1972
In 1967, Israel defeated the armies of Egypt and Syria in the Six Day War. It is
difficult to overstate the importance of this event to the politics of the Middle East in
general and of Palestine in particular. Palestinian political-military groups faced a
41

“Harakat al-Watanniya li-Tahrir Filastin”
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watershed moment. Realizing that they could not rely on Arab armies to defeat Israel,
Fatah’s leadership maintained relations with Arab states (while not expecting them to
intervene), great powers, and other states. By 1969, this group had become the largest
faction in the PLO and effectively taken the reins of the Palestinian national movement
(Miller 1983). This allows me to draw on data from a wide range of primary and
secondary sources.
In March 1970, a delegation from Fatah visited Beijing: indeed, Arafat is quoted
as saying that the People’s Republic of China was “the biggest influence in supporting
our revolution and supporting its perseverance”. (Harris 1977). Prior to 1967, China had
already met with members of the PLO. In 1965, a delegation led by Ahmed Shuqairy
arrived in Peking to “flag-waving crowds beating drums and gongs” (Cooley 1971). This
visit resulted in Shuqairy’s signing of a pact for Chinese diplomatic, economic, and
military support. According to an Israeli military report released in 1967, such aid
consisted of small arms as well as “anti-tank and anti-vehicle artillery, decontamination
chemicals and carloads of poison gas” (Cooley 1971). Kirisci (1986) notes how Fatah’s
ideology and framing strategies played a key role in consolidating support China and
other Communist states in Asia. Visits from Arafat and other PLO officials coincided
with the Chinese government stating that the issue of Palestinian self-determination was
“no longer [merely] an international dispute over refugees, but [a] manifestation of the
national liberation struggle of a distinct Palestinian people”. Arafat likewise made visits
to North Korea and North Vietnam in the early 1970s, which resulted in the opening of
diplomatic offices in these states and the provision of support. Israeli (in Norton and
Greenberg 1989), notes the importance of supply-side factors in this relationship, such as
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Sino-Soviet rivalry. However, he does not take into account demand-side incentives,
such as the internal conflict over ideological aims within the PLO more broadly and
within Fatah in particular. These conflicts over doctrine, and, ultimately, the political
aims of the group, influenced to whom they directed their appeals.
Fatah’s rhetoric was directed to Arab as well as non-Arab audiences. Indeed, this
was necessary as the “core Problem” that Fatah face was winning “official Arab
recognition” after 1967 (Mishal 1986). As previously evinced, it was necessary for Fatah
to appeal to the maximalist aspirations of the Pan-Arab governments of Syria, Iraq, and
Egypt, while emphasizing the local nature of their revolution so as not to alienate
supporters who feared irredentism and to ensure that Palestinian refugee populations
would continue to provide them with support. In a 1968 interview with the newspaper
Al-Muharrir, Yasser Arafat described the Palestinian struggle for Palestine as
“Palestinian in face, but Arab in heart”, and in a 1970 statement released from Beirut, a
Fatah spokesman stated: “We in Fatah view Palestine in terms of [Arab] national, not
geographic dimensions”. However, in an interview with the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Rai
al-Aam, Fatah official Hani Al-Hassan stated: “We in the Palestinian revolution aspire to
the day we will begin our social revolution, but it is nonsense to insist that we wage both
[Palestinian and Arab] revolutions together, because if we do, we will lose both”.
What was the reality of the situation? Fatah sought to achieve their “parochial”
goal of taking control over all of Mandate Palestine before seeking Arab unity. Mishal
(1986) notes how Arafat sought to make appeals to both Arab Nationalist ideals while
reassuring his Arab backers of non-interference in their own governments. In a 1968
interview with French newspaper Jeune Afrique , Arafat said: “Since we do not interfere
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in the affairs of the Arab countries, since we have in common with them and with the
Arab people the objective of ending the Israeli occupation, we see no reason for conflict
between us”. As Mishal (1986) confirms, Fatah’s “cooperative” approach with Arab
regimes was based on the assumption that “the fewer the ideological arguments over
Arab national issues, the greater the chance to reach a workable consensus and to
mobilize broad support from fellow Arabs”. However, such “cooperation” was
confounded by the creation of PLO statelets, conflict with Arab leaders attempting to coopt the Palestinian cause, and recruitment efforts (Miller 1983). From a perspective of
rebel diplomacy and engagement with populations within Arab states, though, “nonintervention” was almost an impossibility.
Muslim-majority states did not play a significant role in Fatah’s foreign policy in
this period. Though none of the Muslim-majority states listed recognized Israel’s
existence in this period, signaling at least a tacit support of the Palestinian cause, and
Fatah received financial support from Saudi Arabia, I did not see any evidence of
lobbying by this group (Mishal 1986). It is unclear whether or not Fatah lobbied this
state, or if the information is simply missing.
Communist states also played a role in Fatah’s diplomatic efforts. Fatah received
support from the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of the 1967 war, all Eastern European
countries (save for Romania) ended their diplomatic relations with Israel. The
perspectives of Warsaw Pact states evolved substantially between this year and 1972,
changing from simply viewing the issue of Palestine as a refugee problem42 to one of
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national liberation. Kirisci (1986) notes two “breakthroughs” that influenced these states’
perceptions: Palestinian groups’ increased usage of violence on the local level and the
increased discussion of Palestinian rights on the international level.
Fatah first made diplomatic contact with the USSR in 1968, courtesy of Egyptian
leader Gamal abd el-Nasser, who facilitated a meeting between Arafat and Kremlin
officials. However, the movement’s leaders made independent trips to Moscow in the
early 1970s, including a 1971 trip by Yasser Arafat that cemented the provision of
training and medical aid from the Soviets (Reppert 1989). As Reppert (1989) evinces, the
PLO was “willing to seize the initiative in their relations with the Soviets” even as
relations between Moscow and Cairo deteriorated. In this period, as in others, Arafat and
others in Fatah made overtures to Marxist theory and a global struggle against
imperialism. Arafat’s framing of Zionism as an extension of global imperialism matched
the Communist Party’s official view, that defined Zionism as "militant chauvinism,
racism, anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism” (Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 1969).
Fatah’s political doctrine was a heterodox blend of “Islam [and] MarxismLeninism [and also] Third World radical nationalism” (Rubin 1994). As Brubaker and
Laitin (1998) note, there were often incentives to frame conflicts in “grand ideological
terms”, invoking the global struggles against capitalism and imperialism as a means of
mobilizing resources. Thus, SEA did not (and could not) occur between PLO factions and
the USSR, other forms of strategic framing may have likely taken place in diplomatic
engagements
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Another Communist state that Fatah established diplomatic contact with was
Yugoslavia. Yugoslav documents from this period note that Arafat-traveling under the
alias Abu Omar-traveled to Belgrade in 1969 and met with Yugoslav officials from the
League of Communists of Yugoslavia in an attempt to secure the provision of arms
(Batovic). Documents do not indicate that Arafat explicitly framed his appeals in
ideological or ethnic terms, however, given the PLO’s statements on the anti-colonial and
leftist aspects of their ideology-and the fact that they met with officials from the League
of Communists-such framing may have likely taken place. Documents, however, do
indicate that Arafat emphasized how the PLO was seeking to “resolve the position of the
Palestinian people” through armed conflict rather than through negotiations or third
parties (Batovic). Rather than signaling convergent ideological interests, Arafat appears
to have explicitly signaled the PLO’s resolve to use costly tactics. As previously
described, signaling capabilities and resolve is a common strategy that prospective agents
will employ when seeking to gain the support of a principal. Further visits by PLO
officials Husam Hattib and Abu Lottof secured the rights of Fatah to open an information
office in Belgrade in 1971.
Conflict between factions of the PLO within this period hampered Fatah’s
diplomatic efforts with Yugoslavia. Internecine strife nearly caused Yugoslav officials to
postpone a Fatah delegation’s visit in 1969 (Batovic). Other factors, such as Yugoslavia’s
concern that too close a tie to the PLO could alienate it from more conservative Arab
countries, served as obstacles in this period. In 1971, Batovic avers:
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The Palestinian demand for arms supply was
granted, but only on commercial basis, and not as a
donation. Material help from Yugoslavia included
purchasing military equipment through Yugoslav export
company Yugoimport, shipping medical supplies, including
a fully equipped mobile medical unit, medical treatment of
wounded Palestinians in Yugoslav hospitals, education
grants for Palestinian students in Yugoslavia. At the same
time, contacts were established between the Yugoslav
Unions Federation and the Jordanian Labour Federation,
that represented the Palestinians; Yugoslav Red Cross and
the Palestinian Red Crescent; Yugoslav and Palestinian
Student Unions; Yugoslav information agency Tanjug and
Palestinian News Agency Wafa, etc.
What of Fatah efforts to reach out to populations in Arab states with the intent of
gaining support? In the years between 1967 and 1972, Fatah was able to attract and
manage more recruits after 1967 than other Palestinian groups, due largely in part to
resources granted by external supporters that enhanced their political and economic
capacity. As Mishal (1986) maintains, this group entertained support from Egypt as well
as “solid and continuing logistical backing from the Algerians, the Chinese, and the
Syrians”. Even while receiving support from Arab governments, Fatah presented itself as
an alternative to these states’ inability to defeat Israel. As Miller (1983) evinces, “The
guerillas offered Arabs and Palestinians alike a chance to regain self-respect and to create

67

the “new Arab man”. Fatah’s position of strength after 1967, driven by Arafat’s efforts
to unify the PLO, caused Arab states to relent and acknowledge43the legitimacy and
strength of Palestinian resistance groups (Miller 1983). Thus, some of Fatah’s influence
in this period is more attributable to supply-side rather than demand-side factors.
Fatah’s diplomatic efforts were conducted both through direct and indirect means.
As evinced in the preceding paragraphs, Arafat and other Fatah officials made direct
contact with states from whom they sought to receive material and diplomatic support.
However, “indirect diplomacy” was facilitated both through Arab governments and
through multilateral forums. During this period, Arab states such as Egypt and Algeria
facilitated meetings between PLO leaders and other states as well as international
organizations such as the Non-Aligned Movement and Organization of African Unity
(Kirsici 1986).
1968 witnessed the occurrence of the Battle of Karameh. On March 21st, 1968,
Israeli forces launched a cross-border raid into Jordan as retaliation for an attack on an
Israeli school bus. They were met by a combined PLO and Jordanian force which, though
tactically defeated, inflicted substantial casualties on the IDF contingent. This event
proved to be a key recruiting tool. As Miller (1983) avers, Fatah “sought to exploit the
affair to enhance its prestige and create a new mythology”. The group substantially
exaggerated the number of Israeli casualties and played off of the name of the battle’s
location: Karameh is also the Arabic word for “dignity” (Miller 1983).
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In 1970, the PLO was expelled from Jordan during that year’s “Black
September”. Clashes between Palestinian Fedayeen and Jordanian security forces were
common as more and more Palestinian guerillas launched raids from inside the kingdom,
organized their own “state within a state”, and posed a threat to Jordanian sovereignty.
Though, as Miller (1983) notes, the debacle that this ultimately resulted in “left the
Palestinian movement divided, embittered, and with a host of organizational problems”, I
would be remiss to let the outcome of PLO activity in Jordan shape our assessment of the
processes that ultimately lead up to it: and the role of rebel lobbying in said processes.
Palestinian groups were active in engaging in recruiting activities among the
Palestinian refugee populations in Jordan, Lebanon and other Arab states. After the Cairo
Accord of 1969, the constituent factions of the PLO were permitted to establish social,
economic, and legal institutions in refugee camps. Not only did the PLO serve as
governing force in the refugee camps, but as one that “[promoted] a collective political
and national identity among the exiled Palestinians” (Hanafi and Long 2010).
Maintaining and developing this collective identity through means of SEA aided Fatah’s
efforts to recruit from Palestinian refugee populations, maintain territory, and develop
institutions. Fatah and other PLO factions’ “state-within-a-state” in Jordan exemplifies
this (Miller 1983).
Fatah’s diplomatic efforts were constrained both by Palestinian institutions and
international institutions. After Black September, Fatah suffered from a “period of
intense factionalism” (Miller 1983). Aside from internecine disputes, Fatah’s efforts to
“dominate and unify” the PLO as a whole, though successful, necessary took time and
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effort away from outside engagement. These institutional constraints affected the content
and quality of these diplomatic appeals.
The first hypothesis posits that rebel groups will be more likely to lobby states
whose governments have a similar ethnic composition to their own. We receive mixed
support for this hypothesis. Fatah indeed lobbied Arab states for support in this period,
and even employed language invoking Arab identity at the time that it did so, thus
validating H3. However, it also lobbied Communist states such as Yugoslavia and major
powers like the Soviet Union. In these appeals, the group emphasized Leftist and thirdworldist frames of reference.
I also received mixed support for thes econd hypothesis, which posits that rebel
groups will engage diplomatically among ethnically similar populations. Literature
indicates that Fatah was active in recruiting and promoting Palestinian national unity in
refugee camps around the Middle East. However, I was unable to find systematic
evidence of ethnic entrepreneurship occurring, thus not providing support for H4.
4.6b: Fatah from 1972-1977
From 1972-1977, Fatah officials continued to pursue rebel diplomacy as a
strategy for gaining material and normative goods. However, in this period, Fatah faced
severe internal constraints that likely affected its diplomatic activities. After their
expulsion from Jordan, the PLO moved their headquarters to West Beirut, Lebanon. The
shock of the expulsion from Jordan and subsequent organizational problems were the
subject of much of the primary and secondary sources detailing Fatah’s activity in this
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period. It was thus difficult to find systematic evidence for the employment of SEA in
this period.
Fatah’s diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union continued throughout this
period (Kirisci 1986; Sayigh 1997; Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005). Sayigh details how the
USSR offered Arafat additional arms and military training for his forces during a 1973
visit to the Kremlin. Such aid, however, was structured as a way to induce the PLO to
participate in the peace process with Israel and reject its prior maximalist aims. This
helped lead to the adoption of the Palestinian National Council’s 1974 Ten Point
Program, which called for the creation of a “national authority” to rule "every part of
Palestinian territory that is liberated" (Palestinian National Council, 1974).
He visited Moscow again in the summer of 1974 and met with members of the
Politburo in an effort to ensure the continuation of Soviet support to his forces. We can
deduce that Arafat’s diplomatic efforts matched Coggin’s theorization of rebel diplomatic
aims (i.e. seeking both material and normative goods): after his visit, Soviet President
Podgorny spoke in support of establishing a Palestinian state (Kisirci 1986) However,
supply-side forces played a major role in this period as well that may have confounded
Fatah’s efforts to lobby for support. Realpolitik played an important role in USSRPalestine relations. During this period, the Soviet Union lost influence in Egypt in the
wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur War and sought to maintain relations with Palestinian
groups as a means of retaining influence in the Middle East. Reppert, however, outlines
that both supply and demand side factors influenced this dynamic. Ensuring superpower
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patronage was a means of furthering the PLO’s aims towards international recognition44
as well as material and financial support (Reppert 1989). This corroborates Coggins’ and
Huang’s outline of rebel diplomatic aims.
Communist states continued to play an important role in Fatah’s foreign policy in
this period. In 1974, all ambassadors from Warsaw Pact countries met with Arafat in
Damascus (Kirisci 1986). Arafat likewise established ties with Romanian security
services (Andrews and Mitrokhin 2005). Interestingly, Arafat had previously reached out
to the Polish government, it only allowed the PLO to open a diplomatic office in Warsaw
in 1976 (Kirisci 1986).
In a statement released in January, 1973, by the Palestinian National Council,
Fatah leaders called for the establishment of a “national democratic regime in Jordan”,
expressing continuing hostility towards the Hashemite monarchy. In the same statement,
the PNC calls for “the struggle of the Palestinian and Jordanian peoples” to be
“[welded]…to the struggle of the Arab nation”. (Lukacs 1984). I can infer that language
invoking a common Arab identity may have been used in Fatah’s diplomatic activities in
this period.
Fatah engaged in diplomacy with Turkey, one of the Muslim-majority states
listed, in this period, In 1975, Farouk Kaddumi, the head of Fatah’s Political Bureau45,
visited Ankara (Akgün, Gündoğar, and Görgülü 2014). This trip resulted in Turkey’s
recognition of the PLO. Further diplomacy, facilitated this time by the Organization of
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the Islamic Conference in 1976, lead to the opening of a PLO office in Ankara. The role
of the OIC suggests something of the salience of religious ties, however unclear.
Fatah’s goals, as Kirisci notes, were aimed at bringing attention to their cause at
the international level: Arafat’s famous 1974 “gun and olive branch” speech at the United
Nations exemplifies this. PLO diplomatic activity in international forums such as the UN,
NAM, and OAU somewhat confound Asal et. al (2014)’s assertion that ethnonationalist
rebels are less likely to contend for international support as their goals are limited to
members of a specific ethnic group. This finding corroborates Benford and Snow’s
assertion that social movements will use frame extension to portray their aims as
extending to issues that may be of concern to its potential patrons and audiences.
4.6c: Fatah from 1977-1982
In the last period that this study examines, Fatah, as well as other PLO factions,
faced harsh endogenous and exogenous political constraints yet continued diplomatic
activity.
Fatah continued to engage in diplomatic activity with the Soviet Union in this
period. On October 29, 1978, the USSR invited a PLO delegation headed by Arafat to
Moscow (PLO Bulletin, 1978). According to the Bulletin this delegation also included
“Khaled al-Fahoum, Chairman of the Palestinian National congress; PLO Official
Spokesman Abdul Muhsen Abu Maizar, Zuhair Mohsen, Head of the PLO Military
Department; Talal Naji, Head of the PLO Cultural Department; and Faiq Warrad and
Saleh Ra'fat, both members of the PLO Central Council”.
According to a report detailing the proceedings of this meeting,
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“
Arafat had asked to meet in Moscow for the purpose of
consulting with the Soviet leadership on the eve of the
Baghdad conference. During the discussions, we adhered to
the same well-known policy that had been coordinated with
the friends of the socialist community regarding affairs in
the Middle East. Evaluating the situation in the Middle
East, we emphasized that the American-Israeli-Egyptian
deal concluded at Camp David and the separate agreement
on Sinai being prepared on its basis constitute a conspiracy
at the expense of the fundamental interests of the Arab
people. By taking this path, Egyptian President Sadat has
thrown a noose on his neck and keeps tightening it at every
step. He has betrayed shared Arab interests and openly
went over to the camp of those who support Israel” (Wilson
Center)
At this meeting, Soviet officials reassured the PLO leader of their commitment to
the “progressive forces of the Arab world” (Wilson Center). Soviet Foreign Minister
Andrei Gromyko reassured Arafat that “the Soviet leadership and people stand by your
side and will not abandon you until you realize your just national goals, and will offer all
support to your just struggle against the Zionist aggressors and their allies, who only
dream of expansion and domination at the expense of the Arab Nation” (PLO Bulletin,
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1978). Likewise, Arafat nevertheless made multiple references to the goals of “the Arab
people” and framed his efforts as being representative and supportive of their interests.
This reveals several interesting facts. It validates our claim that leaders of ethnic
rebel groups utilizing SEA their dialogues with state leaders. Moreover, it shows that
rebel diplomats will engage in this behavior even when lobbying governments with
whom they do not share an ethnic linkage. More interesting yet, though, it reveals that
ethnic affectation also occurs on the supply side of the state-armed group relationship. In
this case, a principal (the USSR) invoked the identity of its agent (Fatah) in order to
reaffirm its commitment to said agent’s efforts. In this context, Arafat likewise framed
his demands in broad-based ethnic terms. These findings confound my hypotheses on
multiple dimensions, but reveal interesting opportunities for future research.
Fatah’s diplomatic engagement with Arab states continued in this period. On
December 4th, 1977, Fatah and the other factions of the PLO called for the formation of
“a Steadfastness and Confrontation Front”. The introductory text of this document reads:

“In the name of all the factions, we ratify this unificatory
document. In asserting the importance of the relationship of
struggle and nationalism between Syria and the
Palestinians. The Syrian Arab Republic and the PLO
announce the formation of a unified front to face the
Zionist enemy and combat the imperialist plot with all its
parties and to thwart all attempts at capitulation. The
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Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, the Socialist
People's Libyan Arab Jamahirnyah and the PDRY
(People'.s Democratic Republic of Yemen -South Yemen)
have decided to join this front, making it the nucleus a panArab front for steadfastness and combat which will be open
to other Arab countries to join”.
Fatah entertained strong relations with South Yemen during this period. These
links appear to be both a function of the PDRY’s Pan-Arab and Socialist ideology and
Fatah’s exploitation of it. In 1977, Arafat visited this state and was received in Aden as
“Brother Arafat, the President of Palestine” (Halliday). It appears that Fatah’s antiimperialist and third-worldist inclinations were more salient to Yemen’s leadership in this
time period as after his visit foreign ministry officials in Aden announced that
“supporting the just cause of national liberation movements, suppressed by Zionist
imperialist and racist regimes did not constitute an act of terrorism” (Halliday). In the
wake of the Camp David Accords, however, Fatah did not engage diplomatically with
Egypt. Rather, Arafat mocked Egypt’s prime minister, Mustafa Khalil, as “insignificant”
(PLO Bulletin, 1979).
Communist states remained an important part of Fatah’s diplomatic strategy: and,
on the whole, Leftist and Third-Worldist framing strategies were highly salient in this
period. The September, 1979 issue of the PLO Bulletin describes that year’s meeting of
the Non-Aligned Movement and the role of Fatah’s Yasser Arafat in promoting the PLO
therein.
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“In the final session which lasted almost thirteen hours
Chairman Arafat took the floor to point out the importance
of such a resolution. Chairman Arafat referred in his speech
to the continuous Israeli bombardments against Palestinian
and Lebanese civilians in Southern Lebanon. He wondered
whether the Israeli land, sea, and air shelling and
bombardments coincide with the Camp David "peace"
treaty. "The condemnation of the separate peace treaty
might help to stop this hell imposed on us", Chairman
Arafat said.
It is noteworthy to mention that all the speakers at the Sixth
Summit considered the Palestinian problem as a central
world issue. All the speakers unanimously asked for en
equitable settlement of the Palestinian problem. AntiZionism was one of the main slogans at the conference and
among the neon signs of Havana during the night you
always read. "Contra el Sionismo46."”
These continued paeans to Third-Worldism reflect the fact that
rebel groups, like other social movements, can and do employ multiple
frames depending on context. Ethnic affectation would have confused and
alienated many of the non-Arab representatives in attendance: framing
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Fatah’s struggle as part of a broader struggle against imperialism proved a
more effective tool in this scenario.
Despite their affectations to the decidedly Pan-Arab PDRY, Fatah had a
preference for a “specific” solution to the issue of Palestinian statelessness, reflected in
their rhetoric of this period. A statement from Mahmoud Abbas, then a member of the
Palestinian Central Committee , to the Qatar News Agency reflected this: “What is
important now is to force Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories and to establish
an independent Palestinian state. Only then will the Palestinian people determine their
relations [with Arab Countries], taking into consideration the Palestinian people’s interest
and those of the Arab nation at same time” (Mishal 1986). During this time period,
Fatah leaders pushed for the idea of a Palestinian “mini-state” in the West Bank and Gaza
rather than a more maximalist design that incorporated the whole of historic Palestine.
This goal-designed to enable Fatah to “represent its diplomatic activity as contributing to,
or at least not opposing, the PLO struggle for a Palestinian state in the whole of
Palestine” without “deviating from official policy” set by the PLO as a whole and by the
expectations of Arab states (Mishal 1986). Fatah engaged in public diplomacy47 to
convey these aims and win legitimacy on the international level. Though Jones and
Mattiacci (2015) outline how rebels use public diplomacy to gain material resources and
encourage intervention from outside sponsors, this usage of public diplomacy proves that
rebels can seek normative goals as well. Fatah’s public diplomatic efforts took the form
of radio interviews with their charismatic leader, Yasser Arafat. By this time period,
Arafat had firmly cemented himself as the symbolic and actual head of the Palestinian
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national movement: his public declarations were frequent and only served to reinforce
this status. One such interview, with the Monte Carlo radio station, reveals details of
Fatah’s diplomatic efforts germane to my research aims.
Arafat employs ethnically-based language in his rhetoric. When discussing the
Camp David accords, he avers they “[harm] not only the PLO and the Palestinian people,
but also the whole Arab Nation” (PLO Bulletin 1978). He continues to state:
We are now at a historic turning-point, the implication of
which is that this Arab Nation will be or will not be; that
this Arab Nation, which includes 150 million people, will
impose its own will and future, or accept a new colonialism
and containment, and a US-imperialist-Zionist hegemony
over the Arab region48.
What drove these invocations? As evinced in my theory, strategic
ethnic affectation is just so: strategic. It is targeted to specific audiences in
the service of specific normative and material goals. Radio Monte Carlo,
despite its Italian moniker, is an Arabic language media outlet49. Arafat,
being a rational actor, employed a framing strategy in this exchange
tailored to his Arab audience. Though this does not directly validate my
hypotheses, through the inferential process described in the methodology
section, I can infer that such language was influential in swaying Arab
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opinion towards Fatah: Fatah lobbied and received support from Arab
states in this period.
Muslim-majority states expressed broad rhetorical support for the Palestinian
cause in this period. Arafat was able to successfully lobby the (largely Pakistani) Muslim
World League to issue a statement against the Camp David Accords that spoke in support
of the Palestinian right to Jerusalem (PLO Bulletin, 1978). According to the PLO Bulletin
issued that year, “The PLO delegate to the meeting brought with him a letter and a cable
from Arafat with regard to Jerusalem, to the Secretariat of the Islamic League”. I
maintain that these successes were due to the Islamic elements of Fatah’s eclectic
weltanschauung. According to Miller (1983), “[Fatah’s] social philosophy was
conservative and used traditional Islamic symbols to appeal to a traditional Sunni
majority”. Nevertheless, as in previous periods, most support from the Muslim world was
rhetorical rather than material, revealing the limits of these efforts.
4.6d: Assessment of Results
Fatah’s ideological heterodoxy provided it with multiple, actionable frames that it
employed in diplomatic activity. This merits a return to the previously listed criterion of
politically relevant states.
Fatah actively lobbied two of the five major powers listed: the USSR and China.
As none of the major powers in my random sample had an Arab/Palestinian majority
population or an Arab ruling coalition, we find no support for any of the hypotheses Yet
this could be solely attributed to a demand-side ideological affiliation there is a distinct
possibility of an interaction effect between supply side and demand side factors. For
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example, as Byman et al. (2011) note, rebel groups often received state support out due to
states’ rivalries. After the Yom Kippur War of 1973-and the United States’ subsequent
military assistance to Israel, Communist states sought to strengthen their position in the
Middle East against U.S. influence. This supply side factor may have combined with the
known Leftist affectations of Fatah to create a strengthened state-armed group
relationship.
Fatah lobbied all of the Arab states in the sample save for Egypt. What explains
this disparity? First, it is important to recall that Nasser, via the Arab league, lead the
efforts to create the PLO, albeit as a tool that he could manipulate to enhance his standing
among other Arab states (Barnett 1998). Even after the PLO assumed greater autonomy
in the late 1960s, Egypt continuously provided support to its constituent factions
independent of any lobbying efforts on their part. Such support took the form of military
training, intelligence sharing, and the provision of arms and financial aid (Sayigh 1997).
However, the impetus for this activity came from the supply side, not the demand side.
Of the Muslim states listed, evidence suggests that Fatah only targeted Turkey for
lobbying directly, while it indirectly lobbied Pakistan through the Muslim World League.
In comparison to other state categories, from which Fatah sought both material and
normative goods, Fatah seemed to only seek normative goods (in the form of legitimizing
rhetoric) from Muslim states. This appears to be a calculation based on these states’
relative capacities to provide such goods. As Coggins (2011) notes, recognition by great
powers is highly valued by rebel groups controlling (or seeking to control) territory as it
gives them an “in” to a high-status group of actors. Likewise, great powers, being richer
and more militarily powerful, are more capable of providing military and financial
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assistance. None of the Muslim states listed had a comparative or absolute advantage in
military power or wealth, but they were more able than other states to legitimize the
Palestinian national movement in religious terms.
Fatah engaged in rebel diplomatic activity with all of the Communist states listed.
Controlling for the Arab government and population of one of these states, South Yemen,
it is clear that a Communist government had a significant effect on whether or not Fatah
lobbied a certain state. This effect may have been endogenous, with influences coming
from both the supply and the demand side. It is unclear whether Communist states saw
Fatah as a capable agent due to this group’s more out of this group’s leftist affectations or
out of other phenomena on the supply side, such as rivalry. Indeed, the most likely
scenario is a combination of factors. Interestingly, none of the states that Fatah lobbied
were democratic or had highly responsive regimes, which confirms Saideman (2002;
2012)’s assertions.

4.7 The Case of the PFLP
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was founded after the
Six Day War ended in December, 1967 by George Habash. A revolutionary leftist
organization, the PFLP deigned to spread its revolutionary ideals to other states while
engaging in armed resistance against Israel. The PFLP was born of a merger between the
Pan-Arabist Arab Nationalist Movement and other groups such as Youth for Revenge and
the Palestine Liberation Front (Schweitzer 2011). Habash, along with his Arab
nationalist comrade Hani al-Hindi, were active in organizing students in Beirut during the
late 1950s. The ANM gained a direct link to Egypt’s Pan-Arabist president Gamal Abd

82

El Nasser in the wake of a 1954 massacre of student demonstrators: the survivors, who
were expelled from the American University of Beirut, were offered places at Cairo
University under a special order from Nasser himself (Cobban 1984). By 1967, the ANM
had already established itself as an international force. As Cobban notes, they had
acquired members in both the Levant and Arabian Peninsula, particularly in South
Yemen, where the ANM participated in the fight for independence from Britain.
Considered to be Fatah’s chief rival in the period surveyed, the PFLP nevertheless
suffered from internal ideological debates, more than one of which lead to groups of
fighters breaking away to form their own factions50.
This thesis’ period of study begins with the PFLP’s founding, which occurred in
the context of structural and ideological changes within the ANM. The group had begun
to develop a notable “socialist temper” (Cobban 1984). Likewise, efforts to outbid the
already popular Fatah movement had lead it to adopt increasingly violent tactics.
The PFLP is noteworthy for bringing the Palestinian cause to worldwide attention
through attacking international targets they deemed part of the US-lead “imperialistic
world”: airliners, banks, and businesses were all targeted (Schweitzer 2011). How did
this tactically innovative group, however, conduct diplomacy? And what role, if any, did
ethnicity and nationalism play in their efforts?
In addition to reaching out to states and populations for support, the PFLP was
active in making connections with other leftist and nationalist revolutionary movements,
including the Italian Red Brigades, the Basque ETA, and the Irish Republican Army
50

A notable case of this way Nayif Hawatmeh’s 1969 split to form the Democratic Front for the Liberation
of Palestine
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(Schweitzer). These linkages also facilitated the recruitment of non-Arab individuals,
such as Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, better known as “Carlos the Jackal”, which perhaps
indicates a higher level of salience for ideology than for ethnicity. Likewise, time spent
lobbying other groups was time not spent lobbying states or populations in accordance
with my hypotheses.
4.7a: The PFLP from 1967-1972
On December 11th, 1967, the PFLP released their founding document, which
declared: “The struggle of the Palestinian masses in the occupied territories is an integral
part of…the Arab revolution against world imperialism and its collaborating forces”. As
can be seen in this statement, the PFLP employed a heterodox mixture of Arab nationalist
and third-worldist rhetoric in their diplomatic appeals in this period as they lobbied both
Arab and non-Arab states.
“The Political, Organizational, and Military Report of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine”, a series of documents released in 1969, provide a useful
introduction to the aims and ideology of the PFLP. The first section, the eponymous
Political Report, names whom the PFLP considers to be their enemies. In addition to
naming Israel, the Zionist movement, and “world imperialism” as their enemies, the
PFLP targets “Arab Reaction represented in Feudalism and Capitalism” (Kadi 1969). The
authors of the Report state that “merchants, bankers, feudal lords, big landowners, kings,
princes, and sheikhs” are part of a “force which objectively sides with the enemy”.
Though these actors are Arab, the Report continues to state that these “reactionary”
forces are “the camp of the enemy which the Arabs are objectively facing in their war for
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the liberation of Palestine”. The Report thus provides an introduction to the tension and
interaction between ethnicity and ideology in the PFLP’s doctrine.
Great Powers both acted on and were diplomatically acted upon by the PFLP. In
the wake of Black September, the Soviet Union sought to contain the crisis to the greatest
extent possible. As Dannreuther (1998) evinces, the USSR “in no way wanted the
Jordanian monarch to be replaced by a radical Palestinian leadership, including the proChinese George Habash of the PFLP”. The late 1960s represented the PFLP’s “Chinese
Phase” (Sayigh 1997). He notes that this group “emblazoned [its newsletter’s cover] with
Mao Zedong’s portrait or other Chinese motifs, while PFLP literature contained
numerous references to Mao, as well as to Lenin” (Sayigh 1997).
Supply-side forces also played a key role in determining whom the PFLP
targeted for lobbying, particularly the Chinese-Soviet rivalry. Even so, Habash visited the
Soviet Union in late 1972, albeit as part of a PLO delegation with Yasser Arafat (Reppert
1989) In 1970, George Habash visited the People’s Republic of China. However, he
received a cooler reception than Arafat and other Fatah leaders. Chinese leaders harbored
reservations about the more radical Palestinian factions and the potential strategic risks of
providing unconditional support to them, criticizing Habash’s faction for “wrong tactics”
(Kirisci 1986). This reflect’s Raucchaus (2009)’s assertion that risk-averse principals will
attempt to chastise and constrain agents who they feel will ultimately act against their
long-term policy aims. Habash also visited North Korea in 1970, though little
information exists on the nature of his visit or his activities there.
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Muslim-majority states did not play a significant role in the PFLP’s foreign policy
in this or any other period surveyed. While Fatah maintained a conservative religious
philosophy, the PFLP was avowedly secular, leftist, and Pan-Arabist. As much as
legitimization in the eyes of the world’s Muslim population mattered to Arafat’s faction,
legitimization to other leftist groups and Communist states mattered to the PFLP.
The PFLP made explicit appeals to the broader Arab world, took advantage of a
perceived zeitgeist: “The hopes and anticipation of the Arab masses have reached a
qualitatively new level from before the fifth of June”. To Mishal (1986), this represented
the fact that “the PFLP…subordinated the daily struggle over Palestine to the social and
political of the whole Arab world”; that they took “The Arab Revolution Approach” .
This is apparent in the ethnically-based appeals they made to the “People of the Arab
nation”. The PFLP also emphasized the dialectic of class struggle and proletarian
internationalism in their official documents and rhetoric. Their international leftist
ideology played as much as-if not a more significant role-than their ethnic nationalism.
This is evident when one examines the regimes that they considered to be “agents of
imperialism” as well as “enemies of the Arab people” (Mishal 1986). The PFLP derided
such “reactionary” regimes as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, as well as Egypt and Syria. South
Yemen, Iraq, Algeria, and Libya, however, were deemed acceptable ideological allies,
and thus worthy principals. Their ideology lead them to consider other Communist
countries and rebel groups allies and potential patrons as natural allies and providers of
support, particularly China (Sayigh 1997).
The PFLP suffered political constraints in this period due to intra-group
ideological conflict. In 1968, Nayef Hawatmeh, one of the original founders of the PFLP,
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broke away from the faction to form his own, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (DFLP). Hawatmeh favored a stronger alliance with the Soviet Union and a
more staunch ideological commitment to Marxism-Leninism in opposition to the PFLP’s
perceived Petty-Bourgeois tendencies (Miller 1983). In the same year, Ahmed Jibril,
another PFLP leader, broke away to form the PFLP-GC (General Command), which
favored an explicitly pro-Syrian position. Likewise, the PFLP boycotted the PLO’s
central leadership in this period out of protest for not being granted a high enough
proportion of seats in the Palestinian National Council (Sayigh 1997). These internal
constraints lead the PFLP to undertake more unilateral diplomatic activities all while
limiting its overall ability to be an effective political-military group.
4.7: The PFLP from 1972-1977
Historical events in the period from 1972-1977 confounded the PFLP’s
diplomacy. In 1974, the PFLP withdrew from the PLO’s executive committee in
response to the Ten Point program forwarded by Fatah and the PLO’s “mainstream”.
Likewise, at the end of this time period, the PFLP became embroiled in the Lebanese
Civil War. While at the start of the war Fatah attempted to remain neutral and mediate
between the different Lebanese sects, the PFLP saw this conflict as “a rightist, imperialist
conspiracy to destroy “the Palestinian and Lebanese revolutions” (Miller 1983). Habash
saw Arafat’s more moderate position as inviting defeat at the hands of Lebanese
Maronite Christians and their Syrian allies. Ultimately, Syria did intervene in Lebanon in
1976 and struck hard against the PFLP as well as other PLO factions51. Likewise,
Habash’s room to politically maneuver was severely reduced by the intra-PLO fallout
51
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87

that resulted from Egypt’s 1977 peace accords with Israel. Arafat attempted to avoid a
complete break with the Egyptian government, which resulted in the PFLP, DFLP and
other factions distancing themselves from him politically. As with my case study of
Fatah, clear evidence of SEA was difficult to come by in this period. Even so, I deduced
SEA’s presence and found clear evidence of non-ethnic framing as well.
Without support from other PLO organizations, the PFLP thus faced a severe
internal constraint on its diplomatic activity. Likewise, the Lebanon imbroglio imposed
severe costs on it the organization both in terms of wealth and manpower. Perhaps due to
these costs, rebel diplomacy was not a significant part of the PFLP’s strategy in this
period Even so, it entertained close relations with the Soviet Union , Iraq, and Libya
throughout the 1970s. The USSR provided financial support, weapons52 training to PFLP
operatives and underwrote some of their largest operations, such as the 1975 raid on the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Vienna (Andrew and
Mitrokhin 2005). The leader of their armed wing, Wadie Haddad, was the key to this
relationship. However, rebel diplomatic efforts were not directly responsible for this: the
KGB recruited Haddad in 1970 as an asset (Andrew and Mitrokhin 2005). Instead, as
Saideman (2002) and Salehyan (2011) theorized, this is an example of a patron seeking
out a rebel group rather than vice versa. Among Arab states, Sayigh (1997) avers that
despite Iraqi-Libyan financial support, “the combination of [the PFLP’s] internal
instability and Iraqi-Libyan backing encouraged further rhetorical militancy”, implying
that patronage from external states-a supply side factor-affected the rhetoric of the group
rather than vice versa.

52
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This process is a product of two endogenous factors: its fractured internal politics
and its penetration by external state actors. As Pearlman (2011) notes:
“Though any non-state actor is vulnerable to interference,
the more cohesive it is, the more impenetrable its internal
decision-making processes and political-strategic position
will be. The more fragmented, the more outside actors will
be able to manipulate persons or factions within the
movement to act as their proxies”.
This phenomenon is evident through the KGB’s recruiting of Wadie Haddad and
the USSR’s underwriting of PFLP operations. The PFLP’s internal politics in this period
helped bring about this state of affairs. In summary, though ethnic and ideology-based
lobbying occurred in this time period, it is unclear to what extent demand-side diplomatic
forces drove this rhetoric.
4.7c: The PFLP from 1977-1982
The PFLP remained outside of the PLO until 1981. As Sayigh (1997) notes, this
decision was a serious miscalculation that ultimately lead to the strengthening and
legitimization of the PLO mainstream and the weakening of the PFLP and other
rejectionist groups.
While their break from the PLO isolated them from this group’s diplomatic access
to states, the PFLP cooperated with other armed groups during this time period. In 1977,
operatives from this group cooperated with the German Red Army Faction in an airliner
hijacking. Despite its official boycott, the PFLP joined the other factions of the PLO to
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sign the Six-Point Program announcing the creation of a “Steadfastness and Rejection
Front”.
Like other documents released by the PLO, it was the result of much internecine debate
and compromise over rhetoric. Even despite the institutional constraints that it faced, the
PFLP managed to benefit from this diplomatic act. First, the PFLP’s “Arab revolution”
approach was officially endorsed in the document’s 10th article:

“The conference pledges to the Arab nation that it will continue the
march of struggle, steadfastness, combat and adherence to the
objectives of the Arab struggle53. The conference also expresses its
deep faith and absolute confidence that the Arab nation, which has
staged revolutions, overcome difficulties and defeated plots during
its long history of struggle-a struggle which abounds with heroism
is today capable of replying with force to those who have harmed
its dignity, squandered its rights, split its solidarity and departed
from the principles of its struggle. It is confident of its own
capabilities in liberation, progress and victory, thanks to God.

53

Emphasis mine
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The document also secured the cooperation of radical Arab states who historically
cooperated with the PFLP, such as South Yemen, Libya, and Algeria. Article six states:

“In asserting the importance of the relationship of struggle and
nationalism54 between Syria and the Palestinians. The Syrian Arab
Republic and the PLO announce the formation of a unified front to
face the Zionist enemy and combat the imperialist plot with all its
parties and to thwart all attempts at capitulation. The Democratic
and Popular Republic of Algeria, the Socialist People's Libyan
Arab Jamahirnyah and the PDRY (People'.s Democratic Republic
of Yemen -South Yemen) have decided to join this front, making it
the nucleus a pan-Arab front for steadfastness and combat which
will be open to other Arab countries to join.”
This rhetoric may have overstated its true degree of success. The last sentence of
the document praises “Palestinian unity within the framework of the PLO”. This belies
the contentious nature of relationships between Palestinian armed groups in this period.
Supply side factors and internal constraints proved more salient to Palestinian groups’

54

Emphasis mine

91

efforts to gain support in this period than demand-side factors. Even so, I found evidence
of SEA, providing support for my first hypothesis.

4.7d: Assessment of Results
Fewer data were available on the PFLP’s diplomatic efforts between 1967-1982.
This issue of missing data, along with supply-side and institutional factors that limited the
PFLP’s diplomatic capacity, confounded my hypothesis testing. Even so, I observed the
following.
Of the major powers listed, the PFLP lobbied the Soviet Union and China. Of
these two states, China proved to be a more reliable source of support and a greater
ideological influence. This relationship shows signs of endogeneity and a potential for
reverse causality, however.
Of the Arab states listed, the PFLP lobbied Algeria, Libya, and Syria55. These
states are conceived of in scholarly literature as being more revisionist or radical than
others in the Arab world such as Egypt (Fawcett 2004). The PFLP’s maximalist, “Arab
revolution” ideology and appeals thus fit with these states weltanschauungen and
credibly signaled shared preferences. I thus see support for my first hypothesis. The
PFLP’s influence among populations was less clear.
Muslim states did not figure in to the foreign policy of the secular, leftist PFLP.
However, they engaged in rebel diplomatic activity with Communist states, such as South
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As well as South Yemen, which was coded as Communist
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Yemen, the USSR, and China, seeking legitimization along ideological rather than
religious lines.

4.8: Results and Confounding Factors
To reiterate, these case studies were intended to test the following hypotheses:
H1: Rebel groups that share an ethnic identity with the largest group in a state's
population will lobby the state using ethnically-based language
H2: Rebel groups that share an ethnic identity with the majority of the ruling coalition of
a state’s government will lobby the state using ethnically-based language
Likewise, my variables are as follows:
IVs:
A) The closeness in ethnic composition of a state’s ruling coalition to a rebel group
B) The closeness in ethnic composition of a state’s population to a rebel group

DVs:
A) The presence of rebel diplomatic efforts
B) The usage of ethnic appeals within said efforts

4.9a: Hypotheses 1 & 3

My government-based hypotheses received mixed support. While Fatah and the
PFLP were more likely to lobby Arab governments than the majority of great powers and
Muslim states, their propensity to lobby Communist states confounds my assertion.
4.9b: Hypotheses 2 &4
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My population-based hypotheses likewise received mixed support. There was a
high level of covariance between all of my hypotheses: states that had a government
coalition of a given ethnicity tended to have a majority population of the same ethnic
group. Likewise, , there is no clear evidence of indirect lobbying in the cases of Fatah or
the PFLP. Graphically, the results of this analysis can be depicted as follows:
Group Name

1967-1972

Fatah

SEA , Non-Ethnic

1972-1977

No clear results

Framing56
PFLP

SEA, Non-Ethnic

1977-1982

SEA,

Non-

Ethnic Framing
No SEA

Framing

SEA, Non-Ethnic
Framing

When compared with Kirisci’s (1986) conceptualizations of support for the PLO
as a multi-step function or as occurring across levels, PLO rebel diplomacy did not
directly mirror either of these propositions. Palestinian groups lobbied actors from many
of these levels simultaneously rather than working their way up an arbitrary “ladder” of
relevancy. The theoretical processes that Kirisci describes appear to have been better at
explaining the behavior of the actors that were lobbied by the PLO rather than the PLO
actors who chose to lobby them in the first place.
Evidence of “indirect lobbying” via populations within states, though empirically
supported, could not be clearly found. Though some literature (Hanafi and Long 2010)
suggests that PLO militants and workers in the camps helped promote a sense of
56

Such framing as ideological, religious or other framing strategies, e.g. framing conflict in leftist terms
when lobbying Communist states
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Palestinian identity in exile, usage of SEA to influence state policy via refugee
populations can only be inferred.
4.9c: Confounding Factors
One possible reason that we failed to see the expected level of ethnically-based
appeals in these case studies is because of the time period selected. Factors such as the
1961 collapse of the United Arab Republic, the defeat of Arab armies in 1967, and the
death of Gamal Abd El Nasser in 1970 weakened the influence of Arabism among
Palestinians. If I were to change the period of analysis to include the 1950s and early
1960s, more SEA would likely have occurred. However, less rebel diplomacy may have
occurred as well: Palestinian groups were almost wholly subordinated to external
(primarily Egyptian) leadership in this period (Kirisci 1986).
International rivalries also confounded this relationship. Delegation to Palestinian
armed groups as a form of “war by other means” against Israel was one of the driving
factors behind Arab states’ behavior and may have even had greater salience than ethnic
linkages at times. After the 1948 war, Arab states allowed Fedayeen to conduct reprisal
raids from their territory and consistently provided arms and support throughout the mid20th century. Signals of military success also were influential. For example, the successes
of the raids on Kiryat Shmona and Ma’alot in the early 1970s by the PFLP-GC served as
a costly signal of their resolve and won them additional support from the Libyan and
Iraqi regimes.
The internal political dynamics of Arab states had a strong, if uneven confounding
effect In the years after 1948, these states attempted to confound Palestinian refugees’
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efforts to organize politically within their borders: in 1949, for example, Jordan banned
Palestinian social organizations from political activity and, fearing secessionism,
Egyptian authorities cracked down on Palestinian Ba’athists and Islamists in Gaza during
the 1950s.The security fears of Arab regimes, as previously evinced, drove some
Palestinian groups to alter their diplomatic efforts. Fatah, arguably the largest and most
influential of the PLO’s factions, had to engage in framing that presented itself a
legitimate supporter of Arab nationalist ideals, yet within a distinctly Palestinian
framework; after 1969, it referred to “the liberation of Palestine” rather than “ending
Israeli occupation” (Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch 1973). A statement from Fateh
spokesman Hani Al-Hassan notes: “We in Fatah have learned that the Arab nation will
not embark on the course of struggle and cannot change its conditions unless it practices
revolutionary mutiny…Revolutionary struggle as we view it is the only way for the
recreation of the Arab nation, the reformation of its soul, and the reactivation of the Arab
masses”. Thus, it can be seen that groups like Fatah still appealed to broader Arab
nationalism even while they sought more limited objectives. Likewise, the PLO is
something of a unique case among rebel movements, as it was created in a 1964 meeting
of the Arab League as a “Potemkin village” controlled by Arab states (Barnett, 1998).
This was rooted in concern over costs from supporting Palestinian actions against Israel:
the creation and backing of the PLO was an endeavor far less costly than direct military
engagement. The high level of external penetration by Arab states from the very outset
,ay have a strong impact on the results we saw.
The internal dynamics of the Palestinian national movement also greatly
influenced how and from whom its constituent groups sought support. Particularly after
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the “Black September” conflict of 1970 , they Yom Kippur War, and the PLO’s Ten
Point Program (which was perceived by hardliners as limiting the liberation of
Palestinian territory) divisions between the Marxist, qawmiyya-oriented factions and
more mainstream nationalists like Fatah were exacerbated, which ultimately led to the
creation of the Rejectionist Front in 1974. The constituent factions of the Front, the
largest of which was the PFLP, pursued an independent diplomatic agenda targeted at
revisionist Arab states like Libya and Syria. As Pearlman (2014) notes, analyzing the
Palestinian national movement as a singular entity is a difficult, if not fruitless endeavor,
due to the number of discrete factions within it with often divergent motives.
Differing ideological currents within the PLO made its internal politics
continuously contentious. Pan-Arab qawmiyya and Palestinian wataniyya clashed, and
the Marxist views of groups such as the PFLP and DFLP made Arafat’s decision-making
hard to enforce despite his efforts to present the PLO as a unified force (Rubin 1994).
Smaller factions within the PLO, such as the previously surveyed Ba’athist groups, also
confounded Arafat’s vision.
Another confounding factor is outside influence in the PLO’s constituent factions.
As previously detailed, George Habash was recruited by the KGB as an asset. Extant
literature notes that this not an uncommon process. Huang (Forthcoming)) notes that
states can use the offer of diplomatic engagement to influence the behavior of rebel
groups. In his study of militant groups in Kashmir, Staniland (2014) notes that the preexisting weaknesses of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) provided
opportunities for penetration and interference by both Pakistan and India. In the case of
the PLO, different Arab states founded and backed proxy factions within the movement.
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Seeking to create a Ba’athist alternative to Yasser Arafat’s Fatah, the Syrian government
created as-Sa’iqa (“the thunderbolt”) in 1966. Iraq followed a similar course of action
three years later with the creation of the Arab Liberation Front. Though officially a part
of the PLO, Sa’iqa was forced to fight against other constituent factions of the movement
during the Lebanese Civil War. This group, clearly a tool of the Syrian government for
enacting its interests, is a clear example of state exploitation of a rebel movement. Thus,
if we are to judge the PLO as a whole, it does not meet any of the aforementioned
categories.
The strategic employment of ideological, rather than ethnic framing also
confounds this relationship. This can be seen in the DFLP (then PDFLP)’s rebel
diplomatic efforts with the Soviet Union. This group framed itself in Marxist terms and
“Strove to assert itself as the principal Soviet ally within the PLO” (Sayigh, 1997). This
form of framing was strategically employed in the 1960s, and sought to play into Soviet
third-worldist” foreign policy. The assertion that rebel groups can draw upon multiple
frames of reference is substantiated in multiple bodies of literature and is demonstrated
multiple times in this thesis’ case studies.
The time period analyzed may have influenced my results. The defeat of Arab
armies in 1967 significantly affected the salience of Pan-Arab ideology to the PLO’s
constituent factions, which likely had a significant effect on their usage of language
invoking Arab identities-or lack thereof. Even so, the autonomy of said groups grew
during this time period, due in part to the fact that until 1967 Gamal Abd El Nasser (who
was largely responsible for the PLO’s actions during its earliest years) had placed
stringent restrictions on Palestinian political activity (Cobban 1984).
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Chapter Five: Conclusion
This thesis aimed to contribute to the filling of a theoretical lacuna by asking:
“what role do ethnic ties play in rebel groups’ efforts to lobby for state support?” In it, I
reframed Salehyan et. al (2011) and Saideman (2002)’s logic to address the demand side
of the state-armed group relationship, positing that ethnicity can be used as a “screening
device” by rebel groups as well as states. I hypothesized that rebel groups that share an
ethnic tie with the majority of a state’s ruling coalition and/or population are more likely
to lobby them for support. I also maintain that said lobbying will strategically invoke
shared ethnic ties and historical memories, framing appeals in “ethnic terms”. I found that
such framing was used, though in conjunction with others, including the invocation of
ideological frames. This work’s contribution and aim is to start a broader conversation on
the role of the “demand side” in state support and framing processes in rebel diplomacy
This work is only the first to be written on the subject of Statetegic Ethnic
Affectation. Thus, there is substantial room for future research on this topic. First, there is
an opportunity to continue to elucidate the role of ethnicity in rebels’ transnational
political activities. Both this work and Asal et. al (2014) provide a solid foundation for
such endeavors, yet several important questions remain unanswered. Do ethnic linkages
change the amount of support that groups receive or the nature (financial, material,
military) that they receive? Likewise, do rebel groups employ different frames when
seeking material goals and others when they seek normative goals? Most importantly, f-
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urther studies can test the assertions of my theory and determine whether or not my
results are replicable.
This work intends to start a scholarly conversation on a topic of deep salience to
both the academic study of conflict and the efforts of policymakers to contain it. As civil
wars in Syria, Iraq, Ukraine, and other states continue, research on rebel behavior will
continue to be of vital importance to those who seek to discover the processes at work
when rebels turn their eyes to the outside world.
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